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Abstract: We study the tax regulations in relation to dividends and capital 
gains over the last two decades for the UK in order to determine whether 
changes in tax regimes affect corporate payout policy (dividends, share repur-
chases, or a combination). While we can identify investors’ tax-driven prefer-
ences for a specific payout channel, we find no evidence of tax-induced clien-
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 ‘But in the real world there remains one overwhelming reason why dividend policy is not 
irrelevant: tax. The way dividends are taxed can have wide-ranging consequences for how a firm 
is run. In particular, it can influence whether a firm finances itself primarily through equity or 
debt, and how it chooses to return profits to its shareholders.’ (The Economist, 9th January, 
2003) 
‘In Britain Gordon Brown staged an infamous pensions tax “grab” in 1997, which reduced 
private pension funds’ income by around £5 billion (then $8.4 billion) a year by eliminating the 
tax credit on dividend payments.’ (The Economist, 2nd December 2010) 
‘In America dividends seemed to go out of fashion in the 1990s. A yield of 2% or so appeared 
trivial when the market was rising by 20% a year. The disrespect for dividends also reflected the 
belief that, for tax reasons, share repurchases were a better way of returning cash to investors.’ 
(The Economist, 2nd September 2010) 
1. Introduction 
Over the past 15 years, there has been a strong decrease of UK listed firms paying out dividends. 
This decline has only been modestly compensated by an increase in companies adopting share 
repurchases. Fama and French (2001) have shown that fewer US corporations have paid divi-
dends over the last quarter of the last century, but DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004) 
demonstrated that, while the number of dividend-paying firms did indeed go down, the total 
amount of dividends did actually increase.  
When introducing readers to dividend policy, corporate finance textbooks typically refer to 
the dividend irrelevance theorem by Modigliani and Miller (1961): investors are indifferent as to 
whether a firm chooses dividends or share repurchases under the assumption of perfect capital 
markets. Allen and Michaely (2002: 13) phrase it this way: ‘any desired stream of payments can 
be replicated by appropriate purchases and sales of equity’. A number of reasons have been 
advanced that cause the above statement not to hold, including taxation and tax clienteles, the 
use of dividends as a signaling device, the dividend catering theory, and personal motives by 
management induced by the structure of their compensation packages. Share repurchases are 
used for occasional payout of excess cash and is hence a more flexible payout device than 
dividends, which are more ‘sticky’ - especially with regard to downward adjustments (Ofer and 
Thakor, 1987, Stephens and Weisbach, 1989, Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach, 2000, 
Amihud and Li, 2006). CEOs with option packages tend to prefer share repurchases and avoid 
dividends because of the associated negative effect on their personal wealth in case part of their 
remuneration package consists of non-dividend corrected stock options (and restricted stock) 
(Fenn and Liang, 2001, Liljeblom and Pasternack, 2006, Aboody and Kasznik, 2008, Geiler and 
Renneboog, 2014). Companies can adjust their dividends to signal their prospects to the market 
(Bhattacharya, 1979, Miller and Rock, 1985, Allen, Bernardo and Welch, 2000, Allen and 
Michaely, 2002). According to Allen and Michaely (2002), the accumulated evidence indicates 
that changes in payout policy are not motivated by firms’ intentions to signal their true worth to 
the market, but rather suggests that dividends and share repurchases curb overinvestment by 
management. This is in line with Jensen’s (1986) ‘free cash flow theory’, which says that a 
commitment to payout reduces management’s discretion over cash flows. Hovakimian, Opler, 
and Titman (2001) and Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) report that more profitable firms have 
lower leverage ratios and tend to prefer share repurchases to repaying debt. The catering theory 
states that corporate payout decisions reflect investors’ preferences for a specific payout channel 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2004). The idea being that a high dividend premium1 proxies for the 
investors’ taste for dividends and induces managers to opt for a higher dividend payout. In the 
case of a negative dividend premium, managers may react with earnings retentions or the use of 
share repurchases (Geiler and Renneboog, 2014). 
In relation to taxation, Allen and Michaely (2002) learn from the payout literature that there 
seems to be an effect of differential taxes (between dividends and capital gains) in the US on 
share prices, but that there is little evidence of a significant clientele shift triggered by tax-
induced dividend changes. DeAngelo et al. (2008) argue that the introduction of a tax on payout 
should lead to a replacement of payout by retention, but report that such shifts do not occur. 
Even if dividends are taxed and capital gains are not, payouts will not cease to exist because the 
capital appreciation gained by foregone dividends is not one-to-one. It is problematic to attempt 
to transfer insights on taxation to another country as taxation systems often significantly differ 
across countries (and even within a single country, tax rules frequently change over time). Given 
the mixed empirical evidence of the impact of taxes on the payout decision and the lack of non-
US research, we revisit the payout taxation for the UK while at the same time considering 
alternative explanations such as market sentiment, managerial incentives, top management’s 
remuneration and their individual traits, ownership concentration, and company-specific charac-
teristics.  
Over the past two decades, the UK has seen many reforms on the tax treatment of dividends 
and share repurchases. For instance, the tax reform in 1997 withdrew the ability of tax-exempt 
investors (such as pension funds) to reclaim tax credits on dividends, which led to an immediate 
drop in the after-tax value of dividends to these investors of approximately 20% (Bell and 
Jenkinson, 2002, Bond, Devereux and Klemm, 2007). This supported the statement by Bond et 
                                               
1 The dividend premium is typically calculated as the logarithm of the average market-to-book ratio of dividend 
paying firms minus that of non-dividend paying firms (Baker and Wurgler, 2004).
al. (1996) that a more neutral tax treatment of the dividend payout would negatively affect 
dividend payout ratios, which were previously inflated precisely because of the favorable tax 
treatment of dividends.  
Our approach consists of these steps; we examine: (i) the impact of different tax regimes on 
the payout level (over time); (ii) the relative attractiveness of the different payout channels 
(dividends, share repurchases, or a combination of both) by means of a multinomial logit setup; 
(iii) the impact of taxation on switching behavior from one payout method to another using a 
dynamic probit model; and (iv) the relation between taxation on the aggregated dividend payout 
by means of an extended partial-adjustment model.  
We contribute to the literature in the following way: First, with exception of Bell and Jen-
kinson (2002) who focus on the impact of the 1997 reform on institutional shareholders, Bank, 
Cheffins, and Goergen (2004) who investigate the relation between politics and dividend 
payout, and Bond et al. (2007) who study the effect of taxes on corporate valuation, there is 
hardly any research investigating the effect of taxation on payout decisions in the UK. This 
paper is to our knowledge the first to address the effect of taxation on the earnings distribution 
method. Second, this paper provides a thorough account of the many tax changes over the past 
decades related to the payout/retention decisions. Third, our data set is particularly rich: our 
analysis is based on a large panel comprising virtually all listed UK companies (including small 
caps and fledglings) starting in 1997 (at the onset of a period with major tax reforms) until 2007 
(when the financial crises commence). Fourth, in contrast to many US studies, we dispose of 
information on the actual share repurchases (and not just on the announcement of share repur-
chase programs). 
The paper reaches some interesting conclusions. First, among the frequent changes in tax 
regulation, the Finance Act (FA) of 1997 and the abolition of the Advanced Corporation Tax in 
1999 affected the payout choice with decreasing preferences for dividends (relative to both 
earnings retention and the use of share repurchases) over the period 1997-2001. Subsequently 
(over the period 1999-2001), we document a particularly strong tendency to avoid share repur-
chases in favor of earnings retention, or, in the case of payout, in favor of dividends. Since 2002, 
earnings retention is preferred over dividends.  
Second, when we focus on the taxation of dividends and capital gains for specific types of 
large shareholders, we do not find consistent evidence that the after-tax values of dividends and 
share repurchases, which proxy for the tax-induced preferences of those investors, led to tax 
clienteles.  
Third, we investigate whether changes in the tax regulations affect the switching decision 
between dividends and share repurchases in case of an earnings payout. From a dynamic probit 
model, we learn that taxes can affect this switching decision.  
Fourth, to estimate the aggregate level of dividend payout, we extend a partial adjustment 
model by including the relative preferences for dividends or share repurchases induced by taxes 
for individual investors, pension funds, and corporate investors. In line with Poterba (2004), we 
find that the short-run changes of tax parameters only have a small impact on aggregate divi-
dends.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the payout evolu-
tion and Section 3 details the regulatory framework related to earnings payout. Section 4 details 
the various tax regimes since 1994 and lists our conjectures. Section 5 presents the dataset and 
the methodology. Section 6 discusses the results, and Section 7 concludes. 
2. The Evolution of Earnings Payout  
Did the frequent changes in the tax rules influence the payout policy of UK firms or are oth-
er economic determinants responsible? Considering the aggregate payout policy of a pooled 
sample of UK firms from 1997-2007, we find that earnings payout in the form of dividends 
prevails over share repurchases and plowing all earnings back into the company. Panel A of 
Table 1 details that 68.3% of all firms pay out dividends, roughly 28% do not pay out, and only 
about 3% use a combination of dividends and share repurchases. The decision to engage solely 
in share repurchases is rather unpopular – only 0.3% of all firms do so. Firms not paying out 
earnings are rare within the FTSE 350 firms, but are more common among the FTSE Small 
Caps and Fledglings. Combining dividends and share repurchases is more frequently observed 
in FTSE 100 (13.36%) and the FTSE 250 (4.27%) firms. When we consider the amounts paid 
out, the picture looks different: Panel B of Table 1 details that firms pay out approximately 27% 
of EBIT by means of dividends and roughly 47% of EBIT via a combination of dividends and 
share repurchases (if EBIT>0). This is roughly in line with the findings presented by Renneboog 
and Trojanowski (2007), who report an average dividend payout over earnings of about 33%. 
The dividend payout level is higher for FTSE100 firms (30.57%) and the FTSE250firms 
(27.96%) than for FTSE Small Caps (25.84%) and Fledglings (23.22%).  
[Insert Table 1, about here] 
But how did payout policy evolve over time? We find that the number of firms paying out 
dividends has substantially decreased over time: Figure 1 details that while in 1998 about 86% 
of all firms paid out dividends, only around 55% do so in 2007.2 Since 2002, we observe an 
increase in the number of firms combining dividends and share repurchases, and their average 
payout ratio. When firms only use share repurchases, the payout level is very volatile (Figure 2). 
The question remains whether taxation can explain payout levels, changes, and trends. 
[Insert Figures 1 and 2, about here] 
3. Regulatory Framework of the Payout Decision 
While the Companies Act (CA) does not prescribe who is responsible for declaring a divi-
dend, this is typically done by an ordinary resolution by the shareholders on the annual meet-
ing.3 In the UK, an interim dividend is typically paid in between annual meetings when the 
directors are convinced that the firm’s financial position warrants a payout, and a final dividend 
is usually proposed at the annual meeting.4 Share repurchases are regulated by various acts and 
codes, including the Companies Act, the FSA Listing Rules, the Model articles, and the Crimi-
nal Justice Act. The Companies Act 2006 generally prohibit a limited company to acquire its 
own shares, unless several provisions are met: (i) a company should pay for repurchased shares 
in full at the time of the purchase, (ii) a share buyback is limited to 15% of the number of shares 
outstanding, (iii) share repurchases ought to be approved prior to the purchase with a (special) 
resolution.5 The FSA Listing Rules prescribe that the actual price and volume of every transac-
tion, including the purchase date, should be made public as soon as possible and no later than 
7:30am on the day after the transaction. Furthermore, the rules impose a prohibition period for 
share buybacks, which spans 60 days prior to the preliminary announcement of a company’s 
annual or interim report, or, if shorter, the period from the relevant financial year end up to and 
including the date of the announcement.6  
The CA makes an important distinction between market and off-market repurchases7: the 
former take place on a recognized investment exchange (e.g. LSE, AIM) and is subject to a 
                                               
2 Ferris, Sen and Yui (2006), which indicate a decline in the total number of dividend payers from 75.9% to 54.5% 
over 1988-2002. 
3 Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, s. 209. 
4 Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, s. 263-281. 
5 For (i)-(iii), see, respectively, CA, 2006, s. 658, CA, 2006, ss. 690 – 692, CA, 2006, ss. 694 and 701. 
6 FSA Handbook, Listing Rules (LR) 12 and The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations, 2008. The period does 
not apply to buy-back programs, managed by independent external parties, that are already in place and of which 
the dates and quantities to be traded are already disclosed and fixed. 
7 CA, 2006, s. 693. 
marketing arrangement (which occurs if the firm disposes of facilities for trading in those shares 
without prior permission from the exchange and without a limit regarding the time during which 
these facilities are available (Ferran, 2008)). The CA also details that any purchase that is not 
made on a recognized investment exchange or that is not subject to a marketing arrangement is 
an ‘off-market purchase’.8  
Many papers conclude that share repurchases are employed as a substitute for dividends be-
cause of the lower level of commitment associated with their usage (Jagannathan et al., 2000, 
Fenn and Liang, 2001, Brav, Graham, Harvey, Campell, and Michaely, 2005). Therefore, we 
assume that firms opt for open market share repurchases because of their increased flexibility 
(as opposed to dividends) in terms of the expectations they instill with investors. In other words, 
as we expect that firms use share repurchases to avoid commitment, we assume that the repur-
chases in our sample are open-market share repurchases. Our sample contains only companies 
that are listed on the primary market and the alternative investment market (AIM) of the LSE. 
Since December 2003, a firm is allowed to hold treasury shares: it can purchase its own 
shares out of distributable profits for future resale.9  
In sum, there is a multitude of laws that need to be considered in order to engage in share 
repurchases in the UK. In particular the FSA listing rules with their tight disclosure require-
ments, price ranges, and prohibition periods impose restrictive measures on share repurchases. 
As a result, it is also more difficult to use share repurchases in the UK than in the US to exploit 
perceived undervaluation (Rau and Vermaelen, 2002).10
                                               
8 Two variants of off-market repurchases are private repurchases and tender offers. The Listing Rules define a 
tender offer as the intent to purchase all or part of the shares belonging to a class of securities at a maximum or 
fixed price, which is communicated to all shareholders. The tender offer must be open to all shareholders of the 
class pro rata to their existing holdings for at least 7 days on the same terms. If a firm acquires at least 15% of any 
class of its own equity shares within a period of 12 months, it must make a tender offer to all shareholders of that 
class. In the case of private buybacks, the group of potential participants is restricted. The tax consequences of a 
share buyback are the same for a market and an off-market purchase, but the treatment for unquoted companies is 
different (FSA Handbook, Listing Rules, Appendix 1 and 12.4). 
9 Treasury shares give companies flexibility to manage their capital structure as the shares can be re-sold without 
the full range of formalities applying to new share issues. Treasury shares can be used to satisfy entitlements under 
employee share schemes (CA, 2006, s. 724). Treasury shares may not exceed the maximum of 10% of the nominal 
value of the issued share capital at that time. With respect to treasury shares, the company must not exercise any 
right (e.g. voting rights at the AGM) and must not make any distribution of these shares (CA, 2006, ss. 725-726 and 
727-730). 
10 Espenlaub et al., (2010:3) state that “there is little consensus on the information content of open market share 
repurchases”, i.e. it remains questionable whether open market share repurchases are used to exploit (perceived) 
underpricing. 
4. Taxation and Conjectures 
Income tax is to be paid on individual investors’ dividend income although the tax rate on 
dividend income is often lower than for income from labor to compensate for the tax already 
paid at the corporate level. The income tax rate depends on the level of income and is 10% 
(starting rate), 22% (basic rate), and 40% (higher rate) at the end of our sample period, and 
corporation tax is charged on the profits at 30% (main rate) and 20% (small rate). Corporate 
shareholders, who receive dividends from a UK company, do not pay taxes on these dividends.11  
Capital gains tax is levied on the gains from the disposal of a capital asset, e.g. on the sale of 
shares, and applies to both individuals and corporations.12 For the calculation of the gain of a 
listed company it is irrelevant whether the shares are sold on the exchange or off-market. As in 
the case of income tax, there is an ‘Annual Exempt Amount’ for individuals of £9,200 (at the 
end of our sample period, i.e. in 2007-08). For a gain from share repurchases exceeding this 
amount, individuals pay capital gains tax at a flat rate of 20%13, i.e. considering the exempt 
amount their effective tax rate is lower than 20%. Corporations, however, are subject to corpora-
tion tax on the full amount of the gain at a small companies’ rate of 20% or a main rate of 30%. 
The gain is typically calculated as the difference between the disposal proceeds and the original 
purchase price plus allowable related expenditures, several types of which have been operated in 
the UK (including ‘indexation allowance’, ‘taper relief’, and the ‘substantial shareholdings 
exemption’ (SSE)).14  
The problem with the tax treatment as described above is that profits are first taxed at the 
corporate level, and then, when redistributed via e.g. dividends, they are again taxed at the 
individual level as income. To reduce this double taxation, the UK decided to operate a modified 
imputation system for the period 1973-1999. An imputation system offers the advantage that 
part or all of the tax paid by the company can be attributed (‘imputed’) to the shareholders by 
way of a tax credit. Companies can forward these imputation tax credits to shareholders along 
with dividends, thereby representing the tax paid by the company upon its pre-tax profit. In the 
case of share repurchases, the imputation tax credit is equal to the ’distribution element’, which 
is defined as the difference between the market value of the repurchased shares and the book 
                                               
11 Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, s. 208.  
12 Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act, 1992, s 2. Exceptions apply to venture capital trusts, and enterprise invest-
ment schemes. 
13 Per the budget of 22 June 2010, there is a higher rate of 28%. 
14 An ‘indexation allowance’ (applicable between 1982 and 1998) allowed to increase the cost of the shares by the 
change in the retail prices. It was replaced in 1998 by the taper relief, which allowed making deductions related to 
the number of years that a share was held. The SSE was introduced in 2002 and exempts shareholdings of 10% or 
more of the shares in another company (subject to conditions) from capital gains tax. 
value of the corresponding paid-in capital (‘the capital element’). The introduction of the 
Advanced Corporation Tax (ACT) on April 6, 1973 marked the beginning of the imputation 
system aiming at alleviating double taxation.15 While companies had to pay an additional tax on 
distributed profits, they could offset these payments against their corporation tax.16 The return to 
the classical system got rid of the tax credit of the imputation system. In what follows, we 
distinguish between six different tax regimes between 1993 and 2010 covering both the ACT 
imputation and the classical system. In particular, we detail the changes in tax rules on dividends 
and share repurchases. Appendix B provides for each tax regime examples on how the after-tax 
values for both dividends and share repurchases over the various tax regimes are calculated for 
different types of investors. 
4.1. Prior to September 21, 1994 
The partial imputation system introduced in 1973 is called the Advance Corporation Tax 
(ACT).17 Corporations could deduct ACT from the gross mainstream corporation tax for the 
accounting period in which the dividends were paid to arrive at the corporation tax payable. 
ACT offset was only possible up to a certain limit: the ACT together with the net dividend paid 
should equal the company’s taxable profits (Gammie, 1998). ACT exceeding this limit was 
referred to as ‘surplus ACT’ and could be carried backward and forward.18 Nevertheless, if a 
company’s corporate tax liability persistently lagged behind the amount of its ACT payment, the 
option expired (Bank et al., 2004). Hence, if the taxable profits were not sufficient or stemming 
from overseas, corporations were not able to get full ACT relief and faced what is known as the 
surplus ACT problem (Shirley, 1997). 
Dividends 
The income tax on dividends payable depended on the status (and overall income) of the re-
cipient. Individual shareholders received an imputation tax credit that represented the tax paid 
by the corporation. In case an imputation tax credit was attached to dividends, they were referred 
to as ‘qualifying distributions’ (Corporation Tax Act 1988, section 14). The grossed-up dividend 
would then be added to the individual’s income.19 For all but one year during existence of the 
                                               
15 Finance Act 1972, s. 84(1). 
16 Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, s. 239. 
17 FA 1972, s. 84(1). 
18 Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, s. 239(3). Surplus ACT could be carried forward indefinitely and 
backward up to six years. It could be surrendered to majority owned subsidiaries. Shadow ACT rules were intro-
duced to detail the treatment of surplus ACT that has been built up before 6 April 1999. For more details: Practical 
Law Company, 2010: ‘Practice note, Shadow ACT’. 
19 The grossed-up dividend is the sum of the net dividend received plus the associated tax credit. 
ACT, the ACT rate and tax credit were linked to the basic (and lower)20 rate of income tax with 
a starting rate in 1973 of 30% (Harris, 18 June 2010).21 In the tax year 1993-94, however, the 
ACT rate and tax credit were both equal to 22.5%, while the basic rate of income tax payable on 
dividends was equal to 20%. For lower and basic rate individuals, the tax credit would discharge 
the liability created by the grossed-up dividend. For individuals subject to the higher rate of 
income tax, additional tax payments were required equal to the higher rate on the gross dividend 
less the tax credit. Interestingly, the imputation tax credit was partially refundable for nonresi-
dent investors that qualified for special tax treaty provisions, and fully refundable to tax-exempt 
shareholders (pension funds, insurance companies with respect to their pension business, and 
individuals holding shares through Personal Equity Plans).22 Accordingly, UK pension funds 
were not liable to taxation on investment income (interest or dividends) received, but were given 
a tax credit that they could use to obtain a full cash refund. Corporations were also exempted 
from corporation tax on UK dividends, but did not receive tax credits on dividends from UK 
companies.23 In fact, if companies received dividends, the ACT payment was reduced accord-
ingly.24
Share Repurchases 
While in broad terms the exclusive repayment of capital on shares did not form a distribu-
tion and therefore had no tax consequences, the extent to which the repurchase price exceeded 
the original purchase price was treated as a distribution that qualified for ACT relieve. The 
corporation had to pay ACT on this ‘distribution element’ and could then forward a tax credit to 
the shareholder, who could use it to offset personal taxes. At the same time, a capital loss could 
be calculated equal to the difference between the investor’s cost base (original purchase price 
plus an indexation allowance) and the original sales price of the share. Individual shareholders 
who sold their shares were taxed at their personal income tax rate on the value of the repurchase, 
but received the tax credit. The personal income rate in 1993 was 20% for the basic rate of 
income tax and 40% for the higher rate. Pension funds received a tax credit of 25% on the 
distribution element, despite being tax-exempted on capital gains. Corporations were liable to 
                                               
20 Finance Act 1993, Ch. 34, s. 78(1). Note: The lower rate of income tax is applicable in the financial years after 
1993. 
21 Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, s. 14(3). Note: ACT on a qualified distribution of a UK-resident 
corporation was calculated as I/(100-I), with I being the percentage at which income tax at the basic rate was 
charged in the current year. 
22 Section 231(1) ICTA 1988.
23 Foreign dividends were taxable but gave rise to a tax credit, either under UK domestic provisions or under a 
double taxation treaty.  
24 For a company, ACT payable was calculated as: ACT fraction x (dividends paid - dividends received). 
capital gains tax (CGT) on the distribution element. CGT was levied at the rate of Corporation 
Tax (equal to 33% in 1993). As in the case of individual shareholders, corporations were given a 
tax credit and were able to subtract capital losses. We summarize the situation prior to Septem-
ber 21, 1994 in panel A of Table 2. Our calculations presented in Appendix B confirm that all 
individuals (both basic and higher rate individuals) preferred share repurchases. In contrast, 
pension funds and corporations had a strong preference for dividend distributions (because of 
the associated tax credit) over share repurchases and over retaining profits (which generated no 
tax credit), which is in line with Rau and Vermaelen (2002: 246). 
[Insert Table 2, about here] 
4.2. From September 21, 1994 - October 7, 1996 
Dividends 
While both the rate of ACT and the associated tax credit had been reduced in 1993 to 
22.5%, they were further cut to 20% in April 1994. For lower rate tax-individuals, this was equal 
to the income tax rate on dividends. The income tax rate for high tax-bracket individuals re-
mained at 40%. As before, the imputation tax credit was fully refundable to tax-exempt inves-
tors, such as pension funds. In addition, corporations were not liable to corporation tax on UK 
dividends (and did not obtain a tax credit).  
Share Repurchases 
In September 1994, investment banks invented the ‘agency buyback,’ an innovative mecha-
nism that increased the tax attractiveness of stock repurchases in the open market. Shareholders 
sold their shares to a broker who acted as an agent for the company. The agent contacted pen-
sion funds (and other tax-exempt parties such as charities) up-front and prioritized them over 
non tax-exempt institutions. This way, agency buybacks resembled off-market repurchases and 
provided these tax-exempt investors with the opportunity to claim a tax credit on the distribu-
tion. For the period from September 1994 to October 1996, Rau and Vermaelen (2002) report an 
increase in buyback activity, presumably of tax-exempt investors such as pension funds. Indi-
vidual shareholders kept receiving the tax credit and the ability to subtract capital losses, but 
were taxed at their personal income tax rate (either 20% or 40%). Pension funds still received 
the tax credit of 25% on the distribution element, despite being tax-exempted on capital gains. In 
the case of corporate shareholders, corporations were still required to pay ACT on the distribu-
tion element at a rate of 33%. Corporate shareholders received the associated tax credit, and 
although they could deduct it from their mainstream Corporation Tax, the effect was probably 
negligible due to the fact that ACT only affected the timing of tax payments, but not the gross 
mainstream Corporation Tax liability (Devereux, Griffith, and Klemm, 2004). Individual 
investors lost part of the tax credits that were formerly granted on dividends. Share repurchases 
were still relatively more attractive to individual investors. Through the invention of the agency 
buyback, i.e. the idea to structure transactions in a way that allowed to ‘transfer the tax credit 
from taxable to tax-exempt shareholders’ (Gammie, 1998: 434), share repurchases became more 
attractive than dividends to pension funds (and charities and trusts) that intended to sell. Overall, 
corporations still preferred dividends to share repurchases due to the attached tax credits. We 
summarize the situation between September 1994 and October 1996 in panel B of Table 2 
(Detailed calculations are in Appendix B).  
4.3. From October 8, 1996 – July 1, 1997 
On 8 October 1996, the loophole in the legislation was closed such that tax-exempt share-
holders were no longer entitled to a repayment of the tax credits associated with a repurchase of 
shares. However, they were still able to claim the tax credit on dividends. 
Dividends 
The changes in UK tax law of October 1996 had no effect on the treatment of dividends. 
Share Repurchase 
From 8 October 1996, tax-exempt investors, such as pension funds, charities, and trusts, 
could no longer recover tax credits associated with the distribution element of share repurchas-
es.25 Accordingly, the attractiveness for pension funds to engage in share repurchases was 
reduced substantially. The tax changes introduced in October 1996 solely affected the treatment 
of tax-exempt investors (see Panel C of Table 2). While individuals preferred dividends to share 
repurchases, dividends were also the more profitable payout method for both corporations and 
pension funds. The abolition of the loophole by the tax authorities reduced primarily the prefer-
ences of tax-exempt investors such as pension funds to engage in share repurchases. Buybacks 
were no longer more attractive for tax-exempt investors than dividends. In other words, divi-
dends became more interesting to tax-exempt investors than share repurchases. Consequently, 
the number of open-market repurchase completions fell significantly. 
                                               
25 Finance Act 1996, Schedule 7. 
4.4. After July 1, 1997 
Dividends 
On July 2, 1997, the new government radically reformed the taxation of dividend income in 
the UK. The principal aim of this Finance Act (FA97, s.19F) was to abolish the right of pension 
funds to be repaid the imputation tax credit for dividends. The main effect was an immediate and 
significant drop of the valuation of dividend income for pension funds (Bell and Jenkinson, 
2002). In view of pension funds losing the repayment of the tax credit, the main corporation rate 
was reduced from 33% to 31%. FA97 had, however, no immediate dividend tax implications for 
other investor groups. There were no changes to the rates of imputation credit or income tax and 
thus no changes to the dividend tax burden of individual shareholders (Hughes, 1998). Similarly, 
tax-exempt charities, tax-favored personal equity plans (PEPs), non-tax-paying individuals, and 
treaty-protected investors continued to enjoy the regime of refundable tax credits. 
Share Repurchase 
The changes in UK tax law of July 1997 had no direct effect on share repurchases. Still, the 
relative attractiveness of share buybacks rose (with a higher number of share repurchases) as the 
value of dividends was reduced following the abolition of the imputation tax credit on dividends 
for pension (Oswald and Young, 2004) (see Panel D of Table 2). Notably, after April 6, 1998 
individuals were able to claim a taper relief that reduced the gain subject to capital gains tax. 
There was no change for corporations, however, as they could continue to use the indexation 
allowance. 
4.5.  After April 6, 1999 
The UK tax authorities abolished the ACT on 6 April 1999 - a radical and far-reaching deci-
sion that marked the return to a classical taxation system. 
Dividends 
Along with the abolishment of the ACT, the tax credit on dividends for individuals was cut 
to 10%. The tax burden of individuals was, however, not affected because of a simultaneous cut 
in the basic income tax rate on dividends to 10%.26 In addition, the tax rate on dividend income 
for high-bracket individuals was reduced to 32.5%.27 The tax reform affected also other types of 
investors: tax-exempt investors were no longer able to claim credit repayments from the treasury, 
but compensatory payments as a percentage payment of their dividend income were granted to 
charitable investors for a transition period until the fiscal year 2003-2004 (Bell & Jenkinson, 
                                               
26 Finance (No. 2) Act 1997, s. 31. 
27 Finance (No. 2) Act 1997, s. 31(5). 
2002).28 Moreover, non-resident investors benefiting from special tax treaty provisions were no 
longer able to claim credit repayments - for them the value of dividends fell by 6% (Bell & 
Jenkinson, 2002). Corporations no longer had to account for ACT on dividends paid. ACT was 
replaced by quarterly installment payments of Corporation Tax by large companies to compen-
sate the exchequer for lost revenue (Hughes, 1998).               
Share Repurchase 
By the abolition of ACT, companies were no longer required to account for ACT on the dis-
tribution element of share repurchases. UK resident corporate shareholders that received divi-
dends and other distributions continued to be exempted from Corporation Tax. The main rate of 
Corporation Tax was cut to 30% from 1 April 1999. After the abolition of ACT in 1999, the 
after-tax values of the various payout methods to different investors changed significantly (Panel 
E of Table 2 and Appendix B). Lower and basic rate individuals, as well as higher rate individu-
als preferred share repurchases to dividends. The situation for pension funds was not affected. As 
before, they were indifferent between either form of payout. While the after-tax value of share 
repurchases to corporations increased slightly, the after-tax value of dividends was still high. 
Accordingly, corporate shareholders preferred dividends to share repurchases. 
4.6. Since 2002 
For a UK-resident company, the entire buyback price is taken into consideration for the cal-
culation of the chargeable gain. The introduction of the Substantial Shareholdings Exemption 
(SSE) in 2002 affected the taxation of capital gains.29  
Dividends 
The tax law changes in 2002 had no effect on the value of dividend payments. 
Share Repurchase 
On April 1, 2002, a Substantial Shareholdings Exemption (SSE) for capital gains tax was in-
troduced, which exempts shareholdings of 10% or more in another company from capital gains 
tax. The SSE affects the taxation of capital gains and is therefore likely to contribute to a greater 
preference for share repurchases (Panel F of Table 2). While individual investors prefer share 
repurchases to dividends, pension funds and other tax-exempt investors are neutral to the payout 
channel choice. Corporations, however, prefer dividends to share repurchases.  
                                               
28 ACT accumulated before April 6, 1999 could be relieved through a system of Shadow ACT. Transitional relief 
was provided for charities (Finance (No. 2) Act 1997, s. 35). 
29 Companies Regulations 203, SI 2003/1116, sections on Acquisitions of Own Shares, Treasury Shares. 
4.7. Conjectures 
The many tax reforms in the UK enable us to investigate whether tax changes affect corpo-
rate payout decisions. In particular, our data set covers three important changes: (1) the introduc-
tion of the Finance Act in 1997, (2) the abolishment of Advanced Corporation Tax in 1999, and 
(3) the introduction of the Substantial Shareholdings Exemption in 2002. The associated tax 
changes provide a natural experiment for analyzing the effect of taxation on corporate payout.  
The FA97 led to a significant drop in the value of dividends to pension funds and to an in-
crease in the attractiveness of share buybacks, as a consequence, pension funds became indiffer-
ent between dividends and share repurchases. Abolishing ACT resulted in a higher after-tax 
value of share repurchases for individuals, but also a higher attractiveness of dividends to 
corporations. Given the simultaneous cut in the basic income tax rate on dividends for individu-
als and the relatively large ownership stake of corporations, the latter effect is expected to 
dominate. The SSE exempts corporations from the assessment of capital gains tax for sharehold-
ings equal to and above 10% in another company. Consequently, we conjecture that the attrac-
tiveness of dividends was reduced in 1997, rose again in 1999, and then became a less attractive 
payout method relative to share repurchases in 2002 (Conjecture 1).
While Conjecture 1 is on the general tendency of the lax laws to favor/discourage a payout 
(channel), the relative attractiveness of the different types of payout (and the case of no payout) 
still differs across type of investors. The after-tax values in Table 2 and the detailed calculations 
of Appendix B suggest that higher tax rate individuals should have had a preference for retain-
ing earnings (over the last two decades). In case the firms pay out earnings, both higher and 
basic tax rate individuals preferred share repurchases to dividends over the whole sample 
period. Lower rate individuals always preferred share repurchases over no payout save for the 
period since 2002 when no payout dominated. Pension funds had a strong preference for divi-
dends (relative to no payout or share repurchases) but became neutral since 1999. Corporations 
are expected neutral between dividends and earnings retention over the sample period but, in 
case of a payout, prefer dividends to share repurchases (Conjecture 2). 
How do changes in tax legislation, particularly concerning the relative tax burden of divi-
dends and capital gains, affect the aggregate payout? Cutting taxes on dividends should result in 
a higher corporate dividend payout and an increased level of investment due to a reduction in the 
applicable cost of capital (Poterba and Summers, 1985). Poterba (2004) confirms that a reduction 
in the relative tax burden of dividends and capital gains does indeed result in increasing corpo-
rate dividends. Consequently, we conjecture that a decrease in the relative tax burden of divi-
dends (relative to capital gains) positively affects the aggregate level of dividend payout (Con-
jecture 3).
In addition to the impact of taxes on the level and channel choice of earnings payout, we con-
trol for many different factors affecting the payout choices. For instance, Fenn and Liang (2001) 
and Geiler and Renneboog (2014) demonstrate that executive remuneration contracts influence 
the payout decision: stock options are negatively related to the dividend issue decision and 
positively to share repurchases (provided that equity-based pay is not dividend-protected). 
Liljeblom and Pasternack (2007) report for a unique Finnish dataset that the negative relation 
between stock options and dividends does not hold in the case of dividend protection. Hence, we 
include the composition of executive pay contracts in our models. 
Sentiment may also affect the payout decision. Baker and Wurgler (2004) measure the ‘taste 
for dividends’ in the market – typically referred to as the ‘Dividend Premium’– by calculating 
the difference between the (logarithms) of the average market-to-book ratio of dividend payers 
and non-payers. If there is a high dividend premium, firms can cater to this sentiment by issuing 
more dividends. Furthermore, investor sentiment also refers to the idea that behavioral biases on 
the side of the investor may exist: overconfident investors may overestimate their knowledge or 
give much weight to preconceptions about firm value and consequently trade more (Odean, 
1998, Barber and Odean, 2001, Gervais, Heaton, and Odean, 2003). Investors may also believe 
in ‘momentum’ and thus keep on buying stock that has recently gained in value, thereby assum-
ing that the observed trends are persistent (Carhart, 1997). Hence, to capture sentiment, we take 
into account the dividend premium, a stock’s trading volume, and its momentum. 
We also correct for other payout determinants such as firm size (index membership: 
FTSE100, FTSE250, FTSE Small Cap, FTSE Fledgling), the growth opportunities (Market-to-
Book ratio), firm performance (ROA), leverage (Debt/Assets), firm risk (Var(CF) – the variance 
of cash flows), and the level of cash flows (Free Cash Flow/Assets). We also consider various 
governance characteristics, such as board size, board independence, CEO duality, and the 
percentage of female directors on the board. We also consider some traits of the top managerial 
decision maker: the CEO’s age, gender, and tenure. A dividend surprise, the difference between 
the actual dividend paid and the estimated 12-month forward dividend lagged by one year, may 
capture a CEO’s degree of optimism about the future of the firm when he pays out a dividend 
exceeding the analysts’ forecasts. 
5. Data and Methodology 
5.1. Sample Selection and Data Sources 
Our sample comprises most of the UK companies listed on the primary market and the alter-
native investment market (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange. We have payout information for 
1906 companies and 9596 firm-years. The sample comprises companies, included in the 
FTSE100, FTSE250, FTSE SmallCap, FTSE Fledgling, and FTSE AIM.30 Our sample period 
extends from 1997 (following the release of the Greenbury Report in 1995) to 2007 (prior to the 
start of the financial crises). 
We collect the cumulative gross year-end dividend paid and a 12-month forward dividend 
per share from Datastream Advance. The actual share repurchases are gathered from Bureau van 
Dijk’s Zephyr database and are verified by means of information stemming from Capital IQ. The 
remuneration data on CEOs, other executives, and non-executive directors comprise fixed salary, 
bonus, and equity-based pay, miscellaneous remuneration (e.g. transaction bonus, relocation 
expenses, recruitment incentives), and other pay components (‘unusual compensation’, e.g. 
medical insurance cost of the CEO) and is collected from BoardEx and annual reports. The 
dataset on the executive and non-executive directors comprises information on their position, 
gender, tenure, and ownership stakes. The ownership concentration is collected from Thomson 
One Banker and PricewaterhouseCoopers. Accounting information (e.g. total debt, total assets, 
market-to-book, ROA, EBIT), the sector aggregation, and trading information (price of the 
stocks and volatility) stem from Datastream Advance. We also calculate the Fama-French-
Carhart four factors (market return, size or SMB, book-to-market or HML, and momentum) by 
means of data from the Style Research Markets Analyzer. The variable definitions are given in 
Appendix A.   
We adjust the accounting and remuneration information in case the reported length of the fi-
nancial year deviates from the standard 365 days. Moreover, when a financial year is not coin-
ciding with the calendar year, we apply the following rule: if the reported end of the financial 
year lies within the first (last) six months of a given year, we assume the entry belongs to the 
preceding (current) calendar year.  
                                               
30 FTSE Fledgling and FTSE AIM overlap partially. Firms listed on these two indices are usually not included in 
the FTSE All-Share index, which is the aggregation of FTSE100, FTSE250, and the FTSE SmallCaps. 
5.2. Multinomial Logit Model 
In order to examine whether changes in tax regulations affect corporate payout decisions, 
we estimate a multinomial logit model (MNL) with as dependent variable the payout channel 
choice (dividends, share repurchases, a combination of dividends and share repurchases31, and 
no payout). We choose the MNL over the multinomial probit model (MNP) because (i) the 
simpler logit model is often preferable to the more complex probit (Dow and Endersby, 2004), 
as the MNP is likely to suffer from a number of estimation problems, including weak identifica-
tion in application, and (ii) by means of a Hausman test, we test the imposed IIA property 
(Hausman and McFadden, 1984). The explanatory variables include the changes in tax regimes, 
ownership concentration interacted with the tax regime dummies, top executive remuneration, 
market sentiment, and other control variables at the level of the firm and the CEO. We assume 
that there is no natural ordering of the payout alternatives and that the decision maker maximiz-
es his own utility. We neither assume random taste variation nor correlation of unobserved 
disturbances over time. Therefore, we apply a log Weibull distribution which assumes that the 
error terms per individual and alternative are independently distributed and homoscedastic. The 
systematic part for our multinomial logit regression in which we cluster the standard errors at 
the firm level is: 
 .
where  is the systematic part of our utility estimation per individual i and time t. The taxation 
variables are time indicators that capture the years of the main tax changes. The ownership 
variables are the cumulative share stakes held by the CEO, non-executive and executive direc-
tors, institutional investors, individuals and families, companies and pension funds. We include 
both the variables themselves and their interactions with each tax period. The remuneration 
variables include total salary, fees, bonus, stock options and restricted stock, miscellaneous pay 
and other components of pay. The sentiment variables include the Dividend Premium, the 
Trading Volume of stocks over shares outstanding, and Momentum. We also include firm size, 
performance and risk as well as internal corporate governance variables (board size, board 
independence) and CEO characteristics (percentage of female board members, CEO gender, 
CEO age and tenure). We cluster the standard errors at the firm level. 
                                               
31 We combine share repurchases and the combination of repurchases and dividends into one category as there are 
few observations in the former subcategory. 
      In an alternative estimation, we replace the taxation regime variables in the MNL by a direct 
measure that captures the relative attractiveness of dividends and share repurchases from a tax 
perspective. The payout attractiveness measure is based on the relative taxation of dividends 
and capital gains: , where  is the relative payout 
attractiveness by investor type  (e.g. individuals, corporations, pension funds) at time t, is 
the marginal tax rate on dividends, and  is the marginal tax rate on capital gains, and  
refers to the percentage of stock owned by investor  at time t. In other words, the relative 
payout attractiveness measure is the product of an investor category’s ownership concentration 
and his after-tax value of dividends divided by his after-tax value of share repurchases.  
5.3. Dynamic Probit Model 
To examine whether changes in taxation rules affect the switching decision between divi-
dends and share repurchases, we employ a dynamic binary probit model focusing solely on 
firms paying out earnings. Hence, our dependent variable is binary: dividends versus share 
repurchases (including share repurchases in combination with dividends) and we condition this 
choice on the dividends paid out in the previous period. Table 3 indicates that while only about 
54% of all firms that paid out share repurchases in the past continue to do so, the corresponding 
figure for dividend paying firms is approximately 94%. According to Verbeek (2004), there 
exist two possible explanations: (1) state dependence, i.e. the longer a firm has paid out divi-
dends, the less likely it is to change its payout method, and (2) unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. 
firms with certain unobserved characteristics are more likely to pay dividends. Allowing for 
dynamics in the underlying process enables us to derive consistent estimates for the independent 
variables (Bond, 2002). Therefore, we employ a dynamic probit model to allow for both state 
dependence and the initial conditioning problem: including a lagged version of our dependent 
variable helps us to take care of state dependence and the firm-specific effect captures 
unobserved heterogeneity. Hence, our model looks as follows: 
  
where a CEO decides to payout dividends if , and share repurchases or a combination 
of dividends and share repurchases, otherwise. In addition to the variables listed in the above 
subsection, we include past dividend payout  (equals 1 in case of a dividend payout and 
0 otherwise). The random effects probit model is estimated by means of a GLS random-effects 
estimator (Woolridge, 2005). 
[Insert Table 3, about here] 
5.4. Aggregate Dividend Payout 
To examine the effect of dividends and capital gains on the aggregated payout, we use an 
adjusted Lintner (1953) model, in the spirit of Poterba (2004:71) who argues: ‘The standard 
approach to measuring the relative tax burden on dividends and capital gains assumes that each 
investor’s tax parameters affect the aggregate tax preference for dividends versus capital gains 
in proportion to the investor’s ownership of corporate stock’. Therefore, we calculate for each 
company the aggregated weighted-average payout preference parameter , which is defined as: 
 where is the marginal tax rate on dividends, and 
 is the marginal tax rate on capital gains, and  refers to the percentage of stock owned by 
an investor  at time t. This way,  measures the relative tax burden on dividends and capital 
gains – or ’the equity weighted average investor tax preference parameter.’ Contrary to Poterba 
(2004), who focuses solely on taxable household stock holdings, we calculate the aggregated 
tax preference parameter for three types of investors: (i) individual investors (whom we assume 
to be taxed at the marginal rate of the highest tax bracket), (ii) pension funds, and (iii) corporate 
investors. Table 4 shows the corresponding results: for individual investors, the average ratio of 
after tax income from dividends over capital gains equals 82% up until 1998, then increases 
slightly to 83%, and finally declines to 74% from 2003. The average equity stakes owned by 
individuals are in the range of 8-11% over all the years considered. Consequently, the equity-
weighted average tax preference parameter is about 8-12% per year. Particularly in the period 
2000-2002, their tax preference parameter is leaning more strongly towards dividends. For 
pension funds, the average share blocks appears to be very low – around 0-0.4% – but this is a 
clear underestimation due to the fact that stakes below the 3% disclosure threshold do not have 
to be reported. Still, their average ratio of after-tax income from dividends over capital gains is 
high: with exception of 1997 (125%), we observe a constant rate of 100%, indicating that 
pension funds should be neutral w.r.t the two payout channels. Due to the particular low owner-
ship values, we observe equity-weighted average pension fund tax preference parameters close 
to 0% in all years. As a consequence, the tax preference parameter does not capture the impact 
of the tax change in 1997/1998. Lastly, we observe the following values for corporate investors: 
the average share of equity owned is in the range of 23-30%. The average ratio of after tax 
income from dividends over capital gains is 119% for the first three years of our sample and 
118% thereafter. As a result, we find that the equity-weighted average tax preference measure 
of corporate investors is around 28-36% and more volatile than the measures of the other 
investor types. The reason for this finding is two-fold: high ownership concentration in the 
hands of corporations on the one hand, and a strong after-tax advantage of dividends (relative to 
share repurchases) on the other hand. 
 [Insert Table 4, about here] 
To examine the impact of the tax preference parameters on the aggregate level of dividend 
payout, we relate the annual change in the level of dividends to the changes in profits, tax 
preference parameters, and their lagged levels: 
  
where  stands for to the annual change in dividends, is the change in the 
natural logarithm of profit (as measured by ROA), , , and 
 refer to the relative tax burden on dividends versus capital gains for individu-
als, corporations, and pension funds, respectively. To solve the issue of negative earnings in a 
log-log specification, we follow Poterba (2004) and restrict our sample to observations with a 
positive ROA. 
6. Results 
6.1 Corporate Payout Decisions and Tax Regimes.  
The multinomial logit analysis in Table 5 shows that the preference of dividends (relative to 
no earnings payout) declines over time: the tax coefficient is stronger for tax period 1 (1997-
1998), smaller but still positive and statistically significance for tax period 2 (1999-2001), 
relative to the omitted subsequent period (2002 and beyond) (column (1) of Panel A: coeffi-
cients 0.973 and 0.300).  Panel B confirms the preference for dividends relative to share repur-
chases (possibly combined with dividends) for tax period 2, relative to the tax period starting in 
2002. Over tax period 2, we find the strongest aversion to share repurchases relative to divi-
dends and share repurchases hence become more desirable since 2002 (column (2) of Panel A). 
These findings are partially in line with Conjecture 1, in that dividends became much less 
attractive beyond 2001 relative to no earnings payout as a consequence of the associated tax 
changes of FA97 and the abolition of ACT. Still, we do not find that dividends became more 
attractive in 1999-2001 relative to tax period 1997-1998. We also report that share repurchases 
are less desirable than dividends in the tax periods prior to 2002 and that, in line with C1, the 
dividend preference relative to share repurchases is stronger in period 1990-2001.  
 [Insert Table 5, about here] 
Although we will examine the preferences of difference types of blockholders under the 
different tax regimes later, we control in these models for ownership concentration. CEOs with 
larger ownership stakes prefer earnings retention over paying out dividends. Individuals and 
families’ ownership concentration is positively related to dividend payout versus retention (at 
the 10%-level) and negatively related to share repurchases versus dividends (at the 5%-level). 
Pension funds and other institutional investors equity stakes do not seem to be related to payout 
choice and the presence of corporations owning share blocks is related to no earnings payout.  
Column (1) of Panel A also shows a strong negative association between CEO option hold-
ings (Options/Assets) and the decision to payout dividends and, in case of a payout,  a strong 
positive link with the decision to pay out earnings via share repurchases rather than via divi-
dends (Column (3), Panel B). Both results are strongly significant at the 1%-level. Likewise, 
CEOs owning a high number of restricted stocks avoid dividend payout (at the 10% level of 
significance, in column (1), Panel A).  
When we consider the sentiment variables, we find that corporations do not seem to cater to 
the market-wide preferences for dividends relative to share repurchases as the dividend premi-
um is not statistically significant. Momentum is not related to the payout decision either. Both 
Panel A and B show that trading volume is low in firms paying out dividends and is much 
higher for firms not paying out earnings or returning cash to shareholders by means of share 
repurchases. If increased trading volume proxies for investor optimism about a specific stock, 
then we see that more optimistic shareholders invest in companies that plow back their earnings 
in the firm and in firms which signal value creation by mains of the share repurchase channel. 
Larger firms (as measured by index membership)  more frequently opt to pay out dividends 
(rather than retain earnings) as reflected in column (1) of Panel A. The payout propensity by 
means of dividends monotonically declines by size (from FTSE 100 to FTSE Fledglings). Share 
repurchases are more frequently undertaken by the largest firms (FTSE100) and the smallest 
ones (FTSE Fledglings), whereas Small Caps only infrequently resort to this payout channel.  
The profit measure (ROA) confirms that high accounting profit is a prerequisite to pay-
out earnings by either payout channel. Likewise, high free cash flows are significantly and 
positively related to the payout decision (within the 1% level of statistical significance).  High 
market-to-book firms, which have higher growth opportunities, pay out more dividends (Panel 
A, column (1)). This violates the capital structure pecking order stating that firms with many 
value-generating investment opportunities should resort to the cheapest source of funds: re-
tained earnings. Firms with higher leverage more frequently opt for share repurchases (relative 
to dividends). The fact that highly levered firms avoid dividend payment may reflect the fact 
that they prefer to resort to the more flexible payout mechanism of share repurchases as divi-
dend policies are shown to be sticky in Anglo-American markets. When we estimate the effect 
of CEO traits on the payout decision, we find that male CEOs are more likely to opt for divi-
dends than for share repurchases (Panel B), older CEOs prefer dividends over retention and 
share repurchases (column (1)) and column (3)), and CEOs with tenure prefer payout (either by 
dividends or share repurchases) over no payout (column (1) and (2)). 32  
We now investigate tax-induced clientele effects by expanding the above payout choice 
models by interacting the tax regimes with ownership concentration by shareholder type. These 
interaction effects are expected to capture for each shareholder category the preferences for a 
payout method as changes in the tax rules over time also change the relative attractiveness a 
specific way of returning cash (if at all) to the shareholders. In Table 6, we do not find evidence 
of a clientele effect for individuals: neither the interaction terms of the tax regime with CEOs, 
executive directors, non-executive directors and other individuals (and their families) are 
statistically significant (or have the wrong sign). There is only evidence that when CEOs own 
large share blocks, firms pay out fewer dividends and more frequently retain earnings, but this 
is not related to a tax regime. Contrary to our expectations based on taxation, individuals’ and 
families’ ownership suggests a preference for dividends (column (1) of Panel A and column (3) 
of Panel B). There is also no evidence of a tax-induced payout policy choice that caters to 
corporate stakeholders, as none of the interaction terms are statistically significant. The uninter-
acted term of corporate ownership shows that firms prefer no payout over dividends (column (1) 
of Panel A) and over share repurchases (column (2) of Panel B), which is in line with Conjec-
ture 2. When the firm pays out earnings, corporations have no preference for a payout channel 
(column (3), Panel B), but this contradicts Conjecture 2. We expect pension funds to have a 
strong preference for dividends relative to no payout and share repurchases for tax periods 1 and 
to be neutral between the 3 alternatives for tax periods 2 and 3. Contrary to Conjecture 2, we 
find that pension funds prefer no payout over dividends and share repurchases in tax periods 1 
                                               
32 We reestimate the multinomial logit regressions of Table 5 while excluding all financial firms, and find that 
virtually all results are upheld.   
and 2 (columns (1) and (2)). In case of a payout, we see that pension funds are neutral for tax 
period one, which goes against Conjecture 2. In sum, we find little evidence that large share-
holders influence the payout policy in a way that is congruent with the maximization of the 
after-tax value of the payout.  
[Insert Table 6, about here] 
6.2 Relative taxation burden on dividends and capital gains  
We estimate whether the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains as defined in Sec-
tion 5.2, explains the payout choice. We calculate the relative taxation for each of 3 categories 
of shareholders: individuals subject to the highest income tax bracket (this category includes 
executive and non-executive directors), pension funds, and corporations. As before, we estimate 
two types of models: the first captures the main effects of the relative taxation measures and the 
second examines the interaction effects of the relative taxation measures and the ownership 
concentration by type of shareholder.  
Whereas individuals should have preferred earnings retentions over earnings payout and – in 
case of payout – share repurchases over dividends, Table 7a shows exactly the opposite: indi-
viduals were indifferent between no payout and dividends (column (1)), and preferred no payout 
(column (2)) or dividends (column (3)) over share repurchases. Also contrary to Conjecture 2, 
we find that pension funds opt for no payout rather than dividends (column (1)) or share repur-
chases (column (2)), and when the firm pays out cash, they prefer dividends over share repur-
chases (column (3)). Corporations should be neutral between a dividend payout or no earnings 
payout; or should have a tax induced preference for dividends in case of a payout. We observe 
that corporations’ relative tax measure is positively and significantly related to dividends (and 
negatively to no payout) whereas we would expect no relation for this parameter estimate in 
column (1)). Corporations relative tax measure is also positively related to share repurchases, 
and hence negatively to the cases of no payout (column (2)) and dividends (column (3)). Thus, 
our findings are again contradicting Conjecture 2; the corporate payout decisions do not seem to 
be influenced by the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains. The results on the owner-
ship and sentiment variables and the other control variables are similar to the ones reported for 
Table 5.  
We expand the models of Table 7a by interacting the relative taxation variables with the 
ownership concentration of respective shareholder categories. This way we consider the relative 
importance of taxes on dividends and capital gains tax but weigh these measures by the relative 
importance in terms of ownership concentration of the different shareholder classes. We find 
that most of the results of Table 7a are upheld in Table 7b apart from the fact that uninteracted 
relative taxation measures of pension funds and corporations are now neutral with regard to the 
choice between dividends and no payout (which is what we expect for corporations but not for 
pension funds). We observe that hardly any of the interaction terms are statistically significant, 
which fails to support Conjecture 2.  
[Insert Tables 7a and 7b, about here] 
6.3 Persistence in Payout Channel Choice 
We investigate whether taxation affects the persistence in dividend payout, or in other 
words, do companies switch between dividends and share repurchases, conditional on past 
dividend payout and changing taxation regimes. The results from a dynamic probit model 
estimation whereby the dependent variable equals one in case dividends are paid and zero in the 
case of share repurchases are shown in Table 8. From a taxation perspective, we expect that the 
attractiveness of dividends (relative to share repurchases) was lower in 1997, increased again in 
1999, but declined as of 2002. We observe that the past dividend payout variable is strongly 
statistically significant and hence captures the persistence of a corporate payout policy. We find 
also that the changes in taxation rules (in relation to dividend taxes and capital gains tax) affect 
the payout channel choice. In model (1), the tax regime in period 2 (1999-2001) is, as expected, 
significantly and positively related to the decision to issue dividends and we also note the 
decline in the attractiveness of dividends in the third tax period. Likewise, when we omit tax 
period 3, we confirm the increase in the probability that dividends are chosen as a payout 
channel. As before we control for ownership concentration by type of shareholder, the remuner-
ation contracts of top management, investor sentiment, and other possible determinants such as 
corporate size, profitability, risk, leverage, growth opportunities, board structure, and CEO 
traits. Overall, we conclude that the switching decision is mainly affected by the tax period in 
which a decision is made, as well as by the firm’s past payout policy.  
[Insert Table 8, about here] 
6.4 Aggregate Dividend Payout 
In order to investigate how our tax-preference parameters affects aggregate dividend payout, 
we estimate an aggregate time-series model, and an aggregate panel-data model on corporate 
payout. The model we employ has been used by Poterba (2004), but originally dates back to 
Lintner’s (1953) partial adjustment models. Our approach differs from Poterba’s (2004) in these 
aspects: (i) we estimate the model with three different tax preference parameters for individual 
investors, pension funds and corporate investors, and (ii) we aggregate the data in a first specifi-
cation at the investor type level per firm-year (panel data approach), and in a second specifica-
tion at the investor type level by year (cross-sectional approach).   
In line with the US findings by Poterba (2004), the yearly tax preferences and the short-run 
changes in tax preferences have no significant impact on the aggregate dividends (Panel A of 
Table 9). The lagged dividend payout is highly predictive but negatively related to aggregate 
dividend payout. The estimated coefficients imply a long-run dividend elasticity with respect to 
profits of , which is lower than the 0.75 reported by Poterba (2004). 
Likewise, we find long-run dividend elasticities with respect to our individual, pension fund, 
and corporation tax preference measures of -0.002/-0.06157 = 0.03, 0.09709/-0.06157 = -1.58, 
and 0.00257/-0.06157 = -0.042, respectively. Thus the tax preference parameters of the pension 
funds and corporations suggest that the relative tax burden on dividends and on capital gains 
negatively affects the share of earnings that is distributed as dividends, whereas the tax prefer-
ence of individuals indicates an inverse relation. For comparison, Poterba (2004) reports a long-
run elasticity of dividends with respect to his aggregate tax-preference parameter of 3.3, but 
mentions that this findings is somewhat surprising given the growth in share repurchases and 
the fact that it is substantially larger than previously reported results. Our findings do not 
support Conjecture 3 in that the relative tax burden of dividends and capital gain positively 
affects the level of dividend payout. 
The estimates of our second specification model are presented in Panel B. As before, the 
short-run changes of our tax preference parameters generally have a small and insignificant 
impact on aggregate dividends with the exception of past profitability and the current tax 
preference parameter for individuals. The estimated coefficients imply a long-run dividend 
elasticity with respect to profits of , which is higher than the 0.75 
reported by Poterba (2004). Likewise, we find long-run dividend elasticities with respect to our 
individual, pension fund, and corporation tax preference measures of 0.00876/-0.01167 = -0.75, 
-0.02096/-0.01167 = 1.80, and 0.08541/-0.01167 = -7.32, respectively. Thus our tax preference 
parameters for individuals and corporations suggest that the relative tax burden on dividends 
and on capital gains negatively affect the share of earnings that is distributed as dividends.  
Overall, we conclude that short run changes of our tax preference parameters generally seem 
to have a limited effect on the aggregate dividend payout.  
-0.014/-0.06157 ≈ 0.23
-0.010375/-0.01167 ≈ 0.89
[Insert Table 9, about here] 
7. Conclusion 
The question as to whether taxes have an influence on the payout decision has been an on-
going discussion, especially as tax regimes are far from stable over time (Allen and Michaely, 
2003, DeAngelo et al., 2008). This paper documents the major changes to the UK tax system – 
especially the tax on dividends and capital gains tax - over the past two decades and asks 
whether the payout channel choice is influenced by those tax regime changes. We calculate the 
after-tax values of dividends and share repurchases (relative to the case of earnings retentions) 
for different types of shareholders (individuals, pension funds and other institutional investors, 
and corporations) over time while considering the changing income tax rates, corporation taxes, 
and the tax treatment of dividends and share repurchases. We show that individual shareholders 
within the highest income tax bracket would have been best off investing in a firm retaining all 
its earnings, but in case the firm decided to distribute cash share repurchases was the preferred 
channel across all tax regimes over the past two decades. Until 1997, tax-exempt investors such 
as pension funds and charities have a strong preference for dividends because of a tax credit 
they could recuperate, but subsequently became neutral to dividend payout, share repurchases, 
or no payout (from a tax perspective). The situation for corporations is consistent over time: due 
to the fact that the dividends that corporations receive are tax-exempted, this form of payout 
dominated share repurchases. Yet, share repurchases became somewhat more attractive in after-
tax value terms subsequent to 1999 due to a reduction in the corporation tax rate on chargeable 
gains. 
We estimate the effect of the tax treatment of dividends and share repurchases on the corpo-
rate payout decision while considering ownership concentration by type of shareholder, the top 
management’s remuneration contracts, investor and market sentiment, board structure, various 
CEO traits, and a firm’s cash flows, profitability, size, leverage, risk, and growth opportunities. 
We find that the attractiveness of dividends (relative to earnings retentions) declines over time 
(since 1997) and that share repurchases were more desirable in more recent tax periods (from 
2002 onwards).  
While we expected that there would be a tax-induced tax preference for retained earnings for 
higher tax rate individuals (over the last two decades) and in case of a payout a tax-preference 
for share repurchases over dividends, we find the opposite: individuals were indifferent between 
no payout and dividends, and preferred no payout or dividends over share repurchases. Our tax 
analysis predicted that pension funds had a strong preference for dividends (relative to no payout 
or share repurchases) and became neutral after 1999. Again, we find that this is not sustained: 
pension funds opt for no payout rather than dividends or share repurchases, and when the firm 
pays out cash, they prefer dividends over share repurchases. Corporations were expected to be 
neutral between dividends and earnings retention over the sample period but in case of a payout, 
to prefer dividends to share repurchases. We have shown that corporations’ relative tax measure 
is positively and significantly related to dividends (and negatively to no payout). Corporations 
relative tax measure is also positively related to share repurchases, and hence negatively to the 
cases of no payout (column (2)) and dividends (column (3)). Thus, these findings are again 
contradicting our tax-based conjectures. We have to conclude that there is no evidence of tax-
induced clientele effects for corporate payout decisions.  
We have also studied the switch between dividends and share repurchases, conditional on 
past dividend payout, and in a context of changing tax regimes. From a taxation perspective, we 
expect that the attractiveness of dividends (relative to share repurchases) was lower in 1997, 
increased again in 1999, but declined as of 2002. We observed that past dividend payout is 
strongly persistent and that changes in taxation rules do affect the payout channel choice. We do 
find that changes in tax regimes do indeed induce changes in the payout channel, but this is not 
related to the presence of specific types of equityholders. 
Finally, we ask whether taxes have an effect on the aggregate level of dividend payout. 
From our partial adjustment dividend payout model, which includes the relative taxation 
preferences (dividend taxes relative to capital gains), we learn that the tax preference parameters 
of individuals, pension funds, and corporations do not explain the aggregate dividend payment.  
Overall, we find that equity-based compensation received by the CEO and investor senti-
ment in the form of optimism reduces the dividend payout and increase the use of share repur-
chases. We also report that larger firms prefer to pay out earnings and mostly opt for dividends 
(rather than share repurchases). Profitable and cash-rich firms avoid earnings retention and opt 
for share repurchases (rather than for dividends). Still, the main conjectures of this paper are 
rejected because we find no evidence of tax-induced clienteles, as firms do not cater to the tax 
preferences of their shareholders.  
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Figure 1. Payout Channels over Time 
The figure presents the frequency of the use of specific payout channels (dividends, share repurchases, 
combined payout, i.e. both dividends and share repurchases), as well as the frequency that firms do not 
pay out earnings. The data are extracted from Boardex and Zephyr.
Figure 2. Payout by Payout Channel 
The figure shows the amounts paid out divided by EBIT (provided that EBIT>0). The raw data are 







































Table 1. The Frequency of Payout Channel Choice and Average Payout by Company Size 
Panel A documents the frequency of payout channel choice by stock index membership (based on firm-year observations for the period 1996-2007). Panel B reports the total 
amounts paid out (divided by EBIT) by payout channel. The data in Panel B are winsorized at the 5% level and are restricted to EBIT>0. The data are presented by index 
membership. The data are from annual reports and Zephyr. 
Panel A (payout frequency) Total Sample FTSE100 FTSE250 FTSESmallCap FTSEFledgling 
No Payout (%) 28.06 7.61 13.54 22.17 39.05 
(Number of Observations) (2,403)  (82)   (339)   (639)  (569)  
Dividends (%) 68.31 79.04 81.78 76.20 60.12 
(Number of Observations) (5,850)   (852)   (2,047)   (2,196)   (876)  
Share Repurchases (%) 0.32 0.00 0.40 0.28 0.27 
(Number of Observations)  (27)  (-)     (10)  (8)  (4)  
Divids and Share Repurch. (%)  3.32 13.36 4.27 1.35 0.55 
(Number of Observations)  (284)   (144)   (107)   (39)   (8)  
Total (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
(Number of Observations)  8,564   1,078   2,503   2,882   1,457  
Panel B (% paid out) Total Sample FTSE100 FTSE250 FTSE SmallCap FTSEFledgling 
No Payout /EBIT (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(Number of Observations) (2,379) (82) (338) (635) (564) 
Dividends/EBIT (%) 26.97 30.57 27.96 25.84 23.22 
(Number of Observations) (5,774) (844) (2,018) (2,166) (865) 
Share Repurchases/EBIT (%) 16.55 0.00 0.15 14.15 22.22 
(Number of Observations) (23) (0) (7) (6) (4) 
Divs & SRs/EBIT (%) 47.06 44.74 50.77 42.06 58.61 
(Number of Observations) (283) (143) (107) (39) (8) 
Total Number of Observations 8,459 1,069 2,470 2,846 1,441 
Table 2. After-Tax Value of Dividends and Share Repurchases 
This table documents the after-tax values of dividends and share repurchases of a nominal value of British Pounds 100. Table A covers period prior to September 21, 1994, 
Table B the period between September 21, 1994 and October 8, 1996, Panel C the period between October 8, 1996 and July 1, 1997, Panel D the period between July 1, 
1997 and April 6, 1999, Panel E the period between April 6, 1999 and April 1, 2002, and Panel F the period after April 1, 2002. For each panel, we assume that companies 
pay corporation tax at the full rate. The category of pension funds includes insurrance and investment companies in respect of their pension business. Source: own 
calculations. 
Panel A. The After-Tax Value of a Dividend and Share Repurchase of 100 prior to September 21, 1994   
          
  Higher rate individual Lower and basic rate individual Pension fund Corporation 
Dividends 77 100 125 100 
Share Repurchases 93 109 123 84 
The tax rates for individual investors were 40% (higher rate) and 20% (lower and basic rate). The ACT rate on the dividend was equal to 22.5 %; the main rate of Corporation 
Tax was 33%. 
Panel B. The After-Tax Value of a Dividend and Share Repurchase of 100 between September 21, 1994 and October 8, 1996   
          
  Higher rate individual Lower and basic rate individual Pension fund Corporation 
Dividends 75 100 125 100 
Share Repurchases 92 106 100 84 
The tax rates for individual investors were 40% (higher rate) and 20% (lower and basic rate). The ACT rate on the dividend was equal to 20%; the main rate of Corporation 
Tax was 33%.   
        
Panel C. The After-Tax Value of a Dividend and Share Repurchase of 100 between October 8, 1996 and July 1, 1997   
          
  Higher rate individual Lower and basic rate individual Pension fund Corporation 
Dividends 75 100 125 100 
Share Repurchases 92 106 100 84 
The tax rates for individual investors were 40% (higher rate), 20% (lower rate), and 24% (basic rate).  The ACT rate on the dividends was equal to 20%; the main rate of 
Corporation Tax was 33%. 
Table 2: Cont’d.
Panel D. The After-Tax Value of a Dividend and Share Repurchase of 100 between September 21, 1994 and October 8, 1996   
  Higher rate individual Lower and basic rate individual Pension fund Corporation 
Dividends 75 100 125 100 
Share Repurchases 92 106 100 84 
The tax rates for individual investors were 40% (higher rate) and 20% (lower and basic rate). The ACT rate on the dividend was equal to 20%; the main rate of Corpora-
tion Tax was 33%. 
Panel E. The After-Tax Value of a Dividend and Share Repurchase of 100 between April 6, 1999 and April 1, 2002    
  Higher rate individual Lower and basic rate individual Pension fund Corporation 
Dividends 75 100 100 100 
Share Repurchases 90 103 100 85 
The tax rates for individual investors were 40% (higher rate), 23% (lower rate), and 10% (basic rate). Dividends were chargeable at 10 % for lower/basic rate 
Tax payers and at 32.5% for higher rate taxpayers. ACT was abolished and the tax credit was cut to 10 %. The main rate of Corporation Tax was 30%.  
          
Panel F. The After-Tax Value of a Dividend and Share Repurchase of 100 after April 1, 2002      
  Higher rate individual Lower and basic rate individual Pension fund Corporation 
Dividends 67 89 100 100 
Share Repurchases 90 97 100 85 
The tax rates for individual investors were 40% (higher rate), 10% (lower rate), and 22% (basic rate). Dividends were chargeable at 10 % for lower/basic rate 
tax payers and at 32.5% for higher rate taxpayers. The tax credit was equal to 10%. The main rate of Corporation Tax was 30%.  
Table 3. Payout Channel Switches 
The table presents the frequencies of switching from one payout method to another from time t-
1 to time t. The payout choices are: no payout, dividend payout, and share repurchases payout, 
including the combination of dividends and share repurchases. The raw data are from 
Datastream and Zephyr. 
    
Payout 
Channel at (t)     
Payout Channel at (t-1) No Payout Dividends 
Share Repur-
chases Total 
          
No Payout 1,243 190 12 1,445 
(%) (86.02%) (13.15%) (0.83%) (100%) 
          
Dividends 133 3,959 133 4,225 
(%) (3.15%) (93.7%) (3.15%) (100%) 
          
Share Repurchases 10 87 113 210 
(%) (4.76%) (41.43%) (53.81%) (100%) 
          
Total 1,386 4,236 258 5,880 
(%) (23.57%) (72.04%) (4.39%) (100%) 
Table 4. Tax-induced Payout Preferences (Dividends versus Capital Gains)  
The table shows the average share of equity owned (columns (1), (4) and (7)), the ratio of after tax income from dividends over the after tax income from 
capital gains (columns (2), (5), and (8)), and the equity-weighted average investor tax preference parameter, following Poterba (2004) (columns (3), (6), and 
(9)), for individual investors, pension funds and corporations, respectively. The tax preference ratio is calculated as .  
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1997 10.0% 82.0% 9.0% 0.0% 125.0% 0.0% 23.0% 119.0% 28.0% 
1998 8.0% 82.0% 8.0% 0.2% 100.0% 0.0% 30.0% 119.0% 35.0% 
1999 8.0% 83.0% 8.0% 0.2% 100.0% 0.0% 27.0% 119.0% 32.0% 
2000 11.0% 83.0% 12.0% 0.2% 100.0% 0.0% 29.0% 118.0% 34.0% 
2001 11.0% 83.0% 12.0% 0.3% 100.0% 0.0% 27.0% 118.0% 31.0% 
2002 11.0% 83.0% 12.0% 0.2% 100.0% 0.0% 27.0% 118.0% 32.0% 
2003 10.0% 74.0% 10.0% 0.3% 100.0% 0.0% 29.0% 118.0% 34.0% 
2004 9.0% 74.0% 9.0% 0.4% 100.0% 0.0% 25.0% 118.0% 29.0% 
2005 9.0% 74.0% 9.0% 0.4% 100.0% 0.0% 25.0% 118.0% 30.0% 
2006 10.0% 74.0% 10.0% 0.4% 100.0% 0.0% 28.0% 118.0% 33.0% 
2007 9.0% 74.0% 9.0% 0.4% 100.0% 0.0% 30.0% 118.0% 36.0% 
Table 5. Payout Channel Choice and Tax Regimes 
The table presents a multinomial logit regression of the payout channel choice (no payout, dividends, share repurchases & 
dividends and share repurchases) on taxation, ownership concentration, managerial remuneration, investor sentiment, and 
other control variables (such as corporate governance, size and performance measures). Definitions of the included 
variables are given in the appendix of the paper. Panel A assumes no payout as base case. Panel B assumes dividend 
payout as base case. The data are extracted from Datastream and Zephyr.
  Panel A: Base Outcome is no payout
Panel B: Base Outcome is 
dividends
  (1) Dividends (2) SR/Dividends + SR (3) SR/Dividends + SR 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Taxation             
Tax Period 1 (1997-1998) 0.973** 0.010 0.261 0.651 -0.792* 0.090 
Tax Period 2 (1999-2001) 0.300** 0.045 -2.377*** 0.000 -2.709*** 0.000 
Ownership             
CEO ownership -0.021** 0.030 -0.020 0.131 0.001 0.962 
Non-executive ownership 0.000 0.995 0.000 0.989 0.001 0.965 
Executive ownership (excl. CEO) 0.012 0.296 0.001 0.962 -0.010 0.707 
Institutional ownership -0.004 0.290 -0.009 0.220 -0.005 0.476 
Individual & Families ownership 0.027* 0.053 -0.030 0.278 -0.054** 0.034 
Corporate ownership -0.026*** 0.000 -0.020** 0.029 0.005 0.465 
Pension fund ownership 0.000 0.996 0.035 0.590 0.032 0.584 
Remuneration             
Salary/Assets -0.066*** 0.005 -0.224** 0.019 -0.159 0.140 
Bonus/Assets -0.031 0.395 -0.134 0.249 -0.142 0.267 
Fees/Assets -0.320 0.249 -14.840 0.557 -15.688 0.607 
Option/Assets -0.023*** 0.010 0.001 0.678 0.052*** 0.008 
Restricted Stock/Assets -0.010* 0.076 -0.034 0.202 -0.013 0.352 
Miscellaneous/Assets -0.132 0.448 -0.130 0.699 0.163 0.448 
Other/Assets -0.116* 0.064 -0.070 0.462 0.063 0.277 
Sentiment             
Dividend Premium -0.053 0.402 0.014 0.893 0.059 0.496 
Trading Vol. /Sh. Out -0.172** 0.011 0.020*** 0.000 0.249*** 0.003 
Momentum (t-1) 0.325 0.811 1.109 0.654 1.071 0.635 
Table 5: Cont’d. 
  Panel A: Base Outcome is no payout
Panel B: Base Outcome is 
dividends
  (1) Dividends (2) SR/Dividends + SR (3) SR/Dividends + SR 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Other Determinants             
FTSE100 1.125** 0.016 2.097*** 0.000 1.035*** 0.002 
FTSE250 0.665*** 0.002 0.451 0.128 -0.168 0.460 
FTSE Small Cap 0.397** 0.018 -0.187 0.527 -0.572** 0.039 
ROA 3.830*** 0.000 9.133*** 0.000 4.982*** 0.000 
Free Cash Flow/Assets (t-1) 8.270*** 0.000 9.368*** 0.000 2.525** 0.040 
Market-to-book 0.006*** 0.004 0.003 0.469 -0.003 0.353 
Debt/Assets 0.572 0.323 -0.674 0.382 -1.339** 0.022 
Var(CF) 0.057* 0.093 0.032 0.559 -0.032 0.451 
Past Payout 0.012 0.713 0.005 0.874 -0.011 0.507 
Boardsize 0.036 0.316 0.036 0.532 -0.002 0.965 
Female (%) 0.550 0.625 0.604 0.692 0.090 0.941 
CEO gender 0.177 0.716 -0.862 0.184 -1.059** 0.050 
CEO age 0.034*** 0.002 0.003 0.854 -0.031** 0.013 
CEO tenure 0.043** 0.012 0.050** 0.043 0.012 0.501 
Dividend Surprise (t-1) -0.002 0.173 0.001 0.118 0.029 0.151 
Industry dummies   Yes   Yes   
Log-Likelihood   -1877.729   -651.863   
R-squared   0.609   0.722   
Number of observations   4376   3386   
Table 6. Payout Channel Choice and Shareholder Classes by Tax Regime 
The table presents a multinomial logit regression of the payout channel choice (no payout, dividends, 
share repurchases & dividends and share repurchases) on taxation, remuneration, sentiment and other 
determinants. The taxation variables include dummies for the periods 1997/98 and 1999-2001. Panel A 
assumes no payout as base case. Panel B assumes dividend payout as base case. The data are extracted 
from Datastream and Zephyr. 
  Panel A: Base Outcome is no payout
Panel B: Base Outcome is 
dividends
  (1) Dividends (2) SR/Dividends + SR (3) SR/Dividends + SR 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Taxation             
Tax Period 1 (1997-1998) (TP1) 0.865 0.161 0.237 0.754 -0.706 0.164 
Tax Period 2 (1999-2001) (TP2) 0.341 0.256 -3.143*** 0.000 -3.538*** 0.000 
CEO ownership -0.022** 0.029 -0.019 0.134 0.002 0.904 
CEO ownership * TP1 -2.041 0.232 -3.265 0.102 -1.056 0.209 
CEO ownership * TP2 0.015 0.725 -0.296 0.156 -0.317 0.117 
Non-exec. ownership 0.004 0.652 0.004 0.854 0.001 0.953 
Non-exec. ownership * TP1 0.027 0.899 0.623 0.143 0.633 0.136 
Non-exec. ownership * TP2 -0.019 0.320 -0.269 0.169 -0.232 0.199 
Exec. ownership (excl. CEO) 0.016 0.176 0.006 0.819 -0.008 0.764 
Exec. ownership * TP1 (excl. CEO) 2.013 0.228 1.720 0.309 -0.338 0.283 
Exec. ownership * TP2 (excl. CEO) -0.013 0.665 -0.003 0.967 0.010 0.849 
Institutional ownership -0.006 0.170 -0.013* 0.096 -0.008 0.283 
Institutional ownership * TP1 0.003 0.858 0.001 0.974 -0.003 0.867 
Institutional ownership * TP2 0.010 0.299 0.063*** 0.000 0.054*** 0.000 
Individual & Fam. ownership 0.029* 0.080* -0.033 0.289 -0.059** 0.042 
Individual & Fam. ownership * TP1 -0.031 0.502 0.055 0.337 0.085* 0.056 
Individual & Fam. ownership * TP2 -0.002 0.935 -29982.736*** 0.000 -30011.186 .    
Corporate ownership -0.025*** 0.000 -0.019** 0.050 0.006 0.487 
Corporate ownership * TP1 0.004 0.797 -0.004 0.860 -0.007 0.729 
Corporate ownership * TP2 -0.010 0.410 -0.014 0.679 -0.001 0.969 
Pension fund ownership 0.027 0.562 0.071 0.306 0.044 0.439 
Pension fund ownership * TP1 -0.372 0.108 -13.851*** 0.000 -10.620 .    
Pension fund ownership * TP2 -0.180** 0.039 -12.922*** 0.000 -14.017 .    
Remuneration Yes   Yes   Yes   
Sentiment Yes   Yes   Yes   
Other Determinants (size, profit, Yes   Yes   Yes   
 leverage, risk, CEO traits)             
Industry dummies   Yes     Yes   
Log-Likelihood   -1865.104     -644.944   
R-squared   0.612     0.725   
Number of observations   4376     3386   
Table 7a. Payout Channel Choice and Tax-induced Relative Payout Attractiveness 
The table presents a multinomial logit regression of the payout channel choice. The relative taxation variables capture the tax-induced preferences of a specific payout choice 
based on the relative tax burden on dividends and capital gains for different types of shareholders. In Panel A, the tax measure is the after-tax value of dividends divided by 
the after-tax value after capital gains tax In Panel B, we multiply the relative taxation measure with the relative importance of a 
shareholder class  (see Section 5.2). The raw data are from Datastream and Zephyr. 
  Panel A: Base Outcome is no payout Panel B: Base Outcome is dividends
  Dividends SR/Dividends + SR SR/Dividends + SR 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Taxation             
Individuals' relative attractiveness (IRA) 2.408 0.110 -25.207*** 0.000 -27.657*** 0.000 
Pension funds' relative attractiveness (PRA) -66.658** 0.030 -166.54*** 0.001 -95.049** 0.017 
Corporations' relative attractiveness (CRA) 55.506** 0.033 152.874*** 0.000 93.125*** 0.007 
Ownership Yes Yes   Yes   
Remuneration Yes Yes   Yes   
Sentiment Yes Yes   Yes   
Other Determinants Yes Yes   Yes   
Industry dummies   Yes     Yes   
Log-Likelihood   -1800.406     -624.4   
R-squared   0.626     0.733   
Number of observations   4379     3386   
Table 7b. Payout Channel Choice and Tax-induced Relative Payout Attractiveness by Shareholder Type
  Panel A: Base Outcome is no payout
Panel B: Base Outcome is 
dividends
  Dividends SR/Dividends + SR SR/Dividends + SR 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Taxation             
Individuals' relative attractiveness (IRA) 2.483 0.159 -24.976*** 0.000 -27.472*** 0.000 
Pension funds' relative attractiveness (PRA) -55.894 0.224 -151.941** 0.013 -94.355** 0.033 
Corporations' relative attractiveness (CRA) 46.299 0.234 140.269*** 0.007 92.386** 0.015 
CEO ownership -0.122 0.371 1.327 0.270 1.577 0.220 
CEO ownership * IRA 0.258 0.442 -2.351 0.152 -2.840 0.103 
Non-executive ownership 0.020 0.886 0.233 0.470 0.147 0.630 
Non-executive ownership * IRA -0.027 0.884 -0.302 0.476 -0.186 0.648 
Executive ownership (excl. CEO) 0.111 0.559 -0.4* 0.077 -0.552*** 0.000 
Executive ownership * IRA (excl. CEO) -0.127 0.606 0.54* 0.055 0.722*** 0.000 
Institutional ownership -0.311 0.808 -0.654 0.745 -0.088 0.960 
Institutional ownership * CRA 0.260 0.811 0.549 0.748 0.072 0.961 
Individual & Families ownership 0.087 0.623 -0.096 0.874 -0.119 0.854 
Individual & Families ownership * IRA -0.077 0.734 0.089 0.911 0.084 0.921 
Corporate ownership -0.267 0.827 -0.173 0.921 0.062 0.972 
Corporate ownership * CRA 0.205 0.843 0.129 0.931 -0.049 0.974 
Pension fund ownership 0.001 0.971 0.020 0.757 0.012 0.833 
Pension fund ownership * PRA - - - - - - 
Remuneration Yes   Yes   Yes   
Sentiment Yes   Yes   Yes   
Other Determinants Yes   Yes   Yes   
Industry dummies   Yes     Yes   
Log-Likelihood   -1848.303     -622.026   
R-squared   0.616     0.735   
Number of observations   4376     3386   
Table 8. Switching Payout Channels and Changing Taxation Regimes 
The table presents a dynamic probit model on dividend payout versus share repurchase payout. 
The independent variables comprise the dividend policy in the previous period (dummy equals 
one in case of dividend payout), taxation, remuneration, ownership, sentiment, and other 
determinants. The raw data are from Datastream and Zephyr. 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Taxation         
Tax Period 1 (1997-1998)     0.182 0.778 
Tax Period 2 (1999-2001) 0.795*** 2.956 0.977*** 5.731 
Tax Period 3 (2002-2007) -0.182 -0.778     
Past Dividend Policy         
Div (t-1) 1.519*** 12.942 1.519*** 12.942 
Ownership Yes Yes 
Remuneration Yes Yes 
Sentiment Yes Yes 
Other Determinants Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes 
Constant 1.401* 1.892 1.219* 1.659 
Log-likelihood -519.529 -519.529 
N 3269 3269 
Table 9. Aggregate Dividend Payout
The table shows the results from a partial adjustment model on aggregate dividend payout. 
The explanatory variables are lagged dividends and profit, changes in profit,  the (changes in) 
aggregated tax-preference parameters for the main investor classes (individual investors, 
pension funds and corporate investors . Panel 
A is based on panel data, and Panel B on aggregate data. The raw data are from Datastream 
and Zephyr.   
  Cross-section Panel 
ln(Div_t) Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
ln(Profit_t) 0.000 0.977 -0.251*** 0.000 
ln( _Individual,t) 0.075 0.369 -0.105** 0.037 
ln( _Pension fund,t) 0.028 0.672 -0.007 0.940 
ln( _Corporation,t) 0.230 0.146 0.118 0.125 
ln(Div_t-1) -0.062*** 0.000 -0.012 0.501 
ln(Profit_t-1) 0.014 0.328 -0.104* 0.086 
ln( _Individual,t-1) -0.002 0.986 -0.009 0.596 
ln( _Pension fund,t-1) 0.097 0.129 0.021 0.833 
ln( _Corporation,t-1) 0.003 0.989 -0.085 0.131 
Constant 0.626 0.391 -0.081 0.806 
  F(9, 785) = 14.79 F(9, 49) = 2.35 
  R-squared = 0.0614 R-squared = 0.2813 
  # (Obs) = 3146 # (Obs) = 86 
Appendix A 
  
Panel A: Payout and Taxation
No Payout     One outcome of a multivariate variable indicating no  
payout (Y=0).Source: Zephyr. 
Dividends          One outcome of a multivariate variable indicating dividend  
   payout (Y=1). Source: Zephyr.
Share Repurchases  One outcome of a multivariate variable indicating 
share repurchases (Y=2). Source: Zephyr.
Dividends and Share Repurchases  One outcome of a multivariate variable indicating 
dividends and share repurchases (Y=3)..
Dividends/EBIT      B value of dividend payout divided by  
EBIT. Source: Datastream. 
Share Repurchases/EBIT     Balue of share repurchases divided by  
EBIT. Source: Datastream and Zephyr. 
Divs & SRs/EBIT      Value of dividends and share repurchases  
divided by EBIT. Source: Datastream and Zephyr. 
Tax Period 1 (1997-1998)     Dummy equal to 1 for  
period 1997-98. Source: Own calculations. 
Tax Period 2 (1999-2001)     Dummy equal to 1 during for  
period 1999-2001. Source: Own calculations. 
Tax Period 3 (2002-2007)     Dummy equal to 1 for  
period 2002-2007. Source: Own calculations. 
Theta    Equity-weighted average investor tax preference    
parameter.  
Panel B: Ownership 
CEO Ownership      Percentage of equity held by  
CEO. Source: BoardEx.
Executive Ownership (excl. CEO)   Percentage of equity held by executive directors (excl.  
CEOs). Source: BoardEx.  
Non-executive Ownership     Percentage of equity held by  
the non-executive directors. Source: Manifest.
Institutional Ownership     Percentage of equity held by  
financial institutions (banks, invest. banks, invest. 
trusts, insurance co’s, mutual funds, venture capital). 
Source: BoardEx.
Individual & Families Ownership   Percentage of equity held by  
individuals and families. Source: Manifest.
Corporate Ownership     Percentage of equity held by  
corporations. Source: BoardEx.
Pension Fund Ownership     Percentage of equity held by  
pension funds. Source: BoardEx.
Panel C: Remuneration 
Salary(/Assets)       Fixed remuneration paid to executive 
directors (including CEOs). Source: Boardex. 
Bonus(/Assets)       Remuneration based on past performance  
and paid out annually. Source: Boardex. 
Fee(/Assets)       Fixed remuneration (predominantly paid to non- 
executive directors). Source: Boardex. 
Option(/Assets)       The Black-Scholes value of stock options. 
Source: Own calculations based on  
Boardex. 
Restricted Stock(/Assets)  Balue of restricted stock. Source: Own calculations 
based on Boardex. 
Miscellaneous(/Assets)     Sum of transaction bonus, deferred cash bonus,  
severance pay, recruitment bonus, and relocation bo-
nus. Source: Boardex. 
Other(/Assets)       Additional remuneration,  
such as insurance payments. Source: Boardex. 
Panel D: Sentiment 
Dividend Premium      Logarithm of the average market-to-book  
ratio of dividend payers minus non-dividend  
payers. Source: Own calculations based on  
Datastream.
Trading Vol./Sh. Out      Trading volume divided by shares outstanding.  
Source: Own calculations based on Datastream. 
Momentum (t-1)      Lagged momentum variable,  
calculated on nested sorts as a Fama- 
French-Carhart factor. Source: Style Research ltd. 
Panel E: Other Determinants 
Assets (in £’000)      Book value of total assets. Source: Datastream. 
EBIT (in £’000)      Earnings before Interest and Taxes.  
Source: Datastream. 
FTSE100        Dummy equal to 1 if firm is  
member of FTSE 100. Source: Datastream. 
FTSE250        Dummy equal to 1 if firm is member of FTSE 250.  
Source: Datastream.  
FTSE Small Cap      Dummy equal to 1 if firm is member of  
FTSE Small Cap. Source: Datastream. 
ROA (in %)       Return on assets. Source: Datastream. 
Free Cash Flow/Assets (t-1)    Lagged value of free cash flows divided by  
assets. Source: Boardex. 
Market-to-book       Market capitalization of equity divided by  
book value of equity. Source: Datastream. 
Debt/Assets       Total debt divided by common equity.    
Source: Datastream. 
Var(CF)        Variance of cash flows per share.  
Source: Datastream. 
Boardsize        The number of directors on the board.  
Source: Boardex and annual reports. 
Female (%)  Binary variable equals 1 in case of female director and 0 
otherwise. Source: Boardex. 
CEO gender Dummy equal to 1 if CEO is male, and 0 otherwise. 
Source: Boardex. 
CEO age        Age of CEO. Source: Boardex. 
CEO tenure  Number of years CEO has served in current position. 
Source: Boardex. 
Dividend Surprise (t-1)  Difference between actual dividend paid and estimated 
12-month forward dividend lagged by one year. 
Source: Own calculations based on Datastream
Appendix B: Taxation in Practice (  will be an online appendix) 
Given that the tax regulation (and the evolution of the taxation principles over time) is complex, we 
present some numerical examples for the different types of investors by tax regime. For this purpose, we 
make several assumptions: a company has earnings after tax of £5 and 100 shares outstanding at a share 
price of £1. It considers paying out £5 either through a dividend of 5p per share or a share repurchase of 5 
shares at the current market price of £1. Assume that the original issue price (the price at which an 
investor purchased in the past) of the share is 20p per share and that the original purchase price of the 
share plus an indexation allowance (‘investor cost base’) as well as the ‘acquisition cost’ of shares for 
corporations are equal to 50p. The marginal tax rate of the UK individual investor – the sole shareholder - 
is noted t and equal to 20% for an individual taxed at the starting rate of income tax, and equal to 40% for 
a high tax-bracket individual in 1993. In the same year, the main corporation tax rate is equal to 33%. 
Dividends are always expressed net of the basic rate of income tax. The ‘gross equivalent’ of a dividend 
(net dividend paid plus tax credit) is calculated following Bank et al. (2004) as: , with  being 
the tax rate on distributed profits. It is important to note, that individuals may benefit from annual 
exemptions, while this is not the case for corporations. Moreover, the tax position for individuals and 
corporate shareholders may be different if the corporate shareholder is a dealer, or if the special treatment 
for the purchase of own shares by an unquoted company applies. We will, however, not consider these 
special cases in the examples worked-out below. We embark by describing the situation for individual 
investors by tax regime, before we turn to pension funds, and finally to corporations. 
1. Taxation of Individuals 
We assume that the individual investor owns the entire share capital. When calculating his overall 
taxable income, the individual has to include the total dividend paid by the corporation plus the associated 
Advanced Corporation Tax (ACT), and any tax credit that the corporation received on dividends (Gam-
mie, 1998). In other words, the individual is liable to income tax on the gross dividend. If the shareholder 
pays tax at or below the basic rate (the basic income tax limit is £23,70033 for the 1993-94 tax year), 
double taxation is eliminated because the tax liability is reduced by the tax credit received. If the individ-
ual pays tax at the higher rate), he is liable to tax at the higher rate of 40% on (gross) dividend income, of 
which 22.5% of tax credit can be deducted. There is a personal income allowance, i.e. an amount that is 
not liable to income tax, of £3,44534 in 1993-94. Capital gains are generally taxed at the top tax bracket of 
an individual’s income with an annual exempt amount of £5,800 and a lower and basic rate of 20% (for 
the first £23,700) and a top rate of 40% in 1993-94.35
1.1. From 1993: ACT & tax credit: 22.5%, Income Tax: 20%/40% 
Dividend payments:  
If the company distributes a pre-corporation tax dividend of £5, it has to pay ACT levied at a rate of 
22.5% on the distributed profits (‘gross dividend’), i.e. £5  9/31 = £1.45.36 The corporation offsets this 
ACT against its mainstream corporation tax obligation and gives a tax credit equal to this amount to the 
shareholder. The individual shareholder is liable to income tax on the amount of the gross dividend 
                                               
33 If, after deducting the Personal Allowance (see below) from total income, the non-savings income does not 
exceed £23,700, the basic income tax rate applies. 
34 The amount of Personal Allowance may vary depending on age and marital status. 
35 Capital gains are taxed at the top income tax for lower and high tax-bracket individuals. Basic tax bracket 
individuals are liable to capital gains tax at 20 percent, while being liable to income tax at a rate of 25 percent. 
36 See: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ctmanual/CTM20510.htm. 
distributed of £6.45 (i.e. the aggregate of dividend and tax credit). Income tax is then calculated as: £6.45 
 20% = £1.29.37 The resulting tax liability for the lower and basic rate individual is fully satisfied by the 
tax credit from the company, i.e. the after-tax value of a dividend is then equal to £5.16. The value of the 
dividend to the individual after personal taxes (t) can be summarized as: £5 - £6.45  t + £1.45 = £6.45 - 
£1.29 = £5.16. For a higher rate individual who is liable to income tax at a rate of 40%, the after-tax value 
of a dividend is: £5 - £6.45  t + £1.45 = £6.45 - £2.58=£3.87. The lower after-tax value is due to a 
higher tax obligation after deducting the (same) tax credit that exceeds the one of a lower and basic rate 
individual by £1.13, or 17.5% of the gross dividend.  
Off-market repurchases:  
The difference between the repurchase price, £1, and the original subscription price, 20p, is defined 
as the ‘distribution element’. As in the case of dividends, the corporation has to pay ACT on the gross 
’dividend’ at a rate of 22.5%. Hence, in our example, the total distribution element is £(1 - 0.2) 5 = £4, 
and the corporation has to pay 9/31  £4 = £1.16, which it can offset against mainstream corporation tax. 
The ACT can then be used as a tax credit: the selling investor who pays a tax of £5.16  t, where t refers 
to the personal tax rate on the grossed-up ‘dividend’, can claim a tax credit of £1.16, so that the net tax 
paid on the distribution element is £5.16t - £1.16. The difference between the investor’s cost base (50p) 
and the original issue price of the shares (20p) on his 10 shares is considered a capital loss of £5 (0.50 - 
0.20) = £1.5, which is subject to ordinary income tax. A capital loss can only be offset against capital 
gains. Hence for individual investors, the value of a £5 repurchase is worth (in £): 5 – (5.16  t – 1.16) + 
1.5  t = 6.16 – 3.66  t. At a personal tax rate of 20%, this yields a value of £5.43. At a personal tax rate 
of 40%, this yields a dividend value of £4.67.  
On-market repurchases:  
When an investor sells his shares on-market, he does not know that he sells his share to the company 
and hence his profits are taxed as a capital gain and no tax credits can be claimed.38 In this case, we 
cannot draw a general conclusion, as the attractiveness of the buyback program depends on the investor’s 
capital gain tax liability. According to Rau and Vermaelen (2002), if the company repurchases 5/P shares 
at the market price P, and the investor had purchased the shares at an average price B, the total taxes (in 
£) owed after the repurchase are equal to [5 (P - B) / P]  t. There is generally no stamp duty on the 
purchase of the shares by an intermediary, by virtue of the intermediaries’ exemption (subject to various 
conditions).39 If the shares are held as capital assets40 by the shareholder, the sale will constitute a disposal 
for the purposes of tax on capital gains, and a chargeable gain or an allowable loss may arise (subject to 
the anti-avoidance provisions of section 703 ICTA 1988).41  
1.2 From 1994: ACT & tax credit: 20%, Income Tax: 20%/40% 
Dividend payments:  
                                               
37 According to HMRC, the basic rate of tax on dividend income is 20% for the tax year 1993-94 (see Table 4).  
38This may be different if the market maker does not act as an intermediary principal. 
39The intermediaries’ exemption is subject to further conditions as detailed in Section 88 A of the Finance Act 
1986. 
40 Capital assets include common kinds of investment such as shares in a company or units in a unit trust. 
41 While all chargeables arise from capital gains, not all capital gains give rise to chargeable gains. The distinc-
tion between the two is the necessary presence of three factors for a chargeable gain, including a chargeable 
person, a chargeable disposal, and a chargeable asset (Pointon & Spratley, 1988). 
If the company distributes a pre-corporation tax dividend of £5, it has to pay ACT levied at a rate of 
20% on the distributed profits (‘gross dividend’), i.e. £5  1/4 = £1.25 (i.e. 20% of £6.25).42 The corpora-
tion offsets this ACT against its mainstream corporation tax obligation and gives a tax credit equal to this 
amount to the shareholder. The individual shareholder is liable to income tax on the amount of the gross 
dividend distributed of £6.25 (i.e. the aggregate of dividend and tax credit). Income tax is then calculated 
as: £6.25  20% = £1.25. The resulting tax liability for the lower and basic rate individual is satisfied by 
the tax credit from the company, i.e. the after-tax value of a dividend is then equal to £5. The value of the 
dividend to the individual after personal taxes (t) can be summarized as: £5 - £6.25  t + £1.25 = £6.25 - 
£1.25 = £5. For a higher rate individual, which is liable to income tax at a rate of 40%, the after-tax value 
of a dividend is: £5 - £6.25  t + £1.25 = £6.25 - £2.5 = £3.75. The lower after-tax value is due to a 
higher tax obligation after deducting the (same) tax credit that exceeds the one of a lower and basic rate 
individual by £1.25, or 20% of the gross dividend. 
Off-market repurchases:  
As in the case of dividends, the corporation has to pay ACT on the ‘distribution element’ at a rate of 
20%. Hence, in our example, the total distribution element is £(1 - 0.2) 5 = £4, and the corporation has to 
pay 1/4  £4 = £1 (i.e. 20% of £5), which it can offset against mainstream corporation tax. The ACT can 
then be used as a tax credit: the investor who pays a tax of £5  t on the grossed-up ‘dividend’ (where t 
refers to the personal tax rate) can claim a tax credit of £1, so that the net tax paid on the distribution 
element is £5t - £1. The difference between the investor’s cost base (50p) and the original issue price of 
the shares (20p) on his 5 shares is considered a capital loss of 5  (£0.50 - £0.20) = £1.5, which is subject 
to ordinary income tax. Hence for lower and basic rate individuals, the value of a £5 repurchase is worth 
(in £): 5 – (5  t – 1) + 1.5  t = 6 – 3.5t, or at a personal tax rate of 20%: £5.3. At a personal tax rate of t 
= 40%, the value of the dividend would be equal to £4.6. 
On-market repurchases:  
The situation is similar to the one described above. Following Rau and Vermaelen (2002), the total 
taxes after the repurchase are equal to [5 (P - B) / P] t. 
1.3 From 1999: ACT is cancelled, tax credit: 10%, Income tax: 10%/32.5% 
Dividend payments:  
The individual shareholder is liable to income tax on the amount of the gross dividend distributed of 
£5 and the tax credit is calculated as 1/9  £5 = 0.56. Income tax is then calculated as: £5.56  10% = 
£0.56. The resulting tax liability for the lower and basic rate individual is satisfied by the tax credit from 
the company, i.e. the after-tax value of a dividend is then equal to £5. The value of the dividend to the 
individual after personal taxes (t) can be summarized as: £5 - £5.56  t + £0.56 = £5.56 - £0.56 = £5. For 
a higher rate individual who is liable to income tax at a rate of 32.5%, the after-tax value of a dividend is 
equal to: £5 - £5.56  t + £0.56 = £5.56 - £1.81 = £3.75. The lower after-tax value is due to a higher tax 
obligation that exceeds the one of a lower and basic rate individual by £1.25, or 22.5% of the gross 
dividend. 
Off-market repurchases:  
                                               
42 See http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ctmanual/CTM20510.htm. 
In our example, the total distribution element is £(1 - 0.2) 5 = £4. The investor pays taxes of £4.44 
t on the grossed-up ‘dividend’ (where t refers to the personal tax rate) and can claim a tax credit of £0.44, 
so that the net tax paid on the distribution element is £4.44t - £0.44. The difference between the investor’s 
cost base (50p) and the original issue price of the shares (20p) on his 10 shares is considered a capital loss 
of £5 (0.50 - 0.20) = £1.5, which is subject to the ordinary tax rate. Hence for individual investors, the 
value of a £5 repurchase is worth (in £): 5 – (4.44t – 0.44) + £1.5t = 5.44 – 2.94t, or at a personal tax rate 
of 10%: £5.15. At a personal tax rate of t=32.5%, the value of the dividend would be equal to £4.48. 
On-market repurchases:  
According to Rau and Vermaelen (2002), this can be calculated as: [5 (P - B) / P] t.43
2. Taxation of Pension funds 
Dividend payments:  
Prior to July 2, 1997, pension funds were entitled to a 20% tax credit on the tax-inclusive dividend, 
despite being exempted from income taxes on dividends and capital gains. Hence, a £5 dividend paid 
carried a tax credit of 1/4  £5 = £1.25. Therefore, a dividend of £5 was worth £6.25 to a pension fund. 
After July 2, 1997, all tax credits for pension funds were eliminated. Hence, a £5 dividend was worth 
exactly 5 pounds. 
Off-market repurchases:  
Prior to September 1994, pension funds were entitled to a tax credit of 22.5% on the tax-inclusive 
distribution element of the repurchase. In our example, the distribution element was £(1 - 0.2) 5 = £4, 
yielding a tax credit to the shareholder of £4  9/31 = £1.16 in 1993.44 Hence, for this investor, the £5 
buyback was worth £6.16. After September 1994, the same buyback was worth £5 to this investor 
following the elimination of tax credits.45 
On-market repurchases:  
In on-market repurchases, no tax credit exists. Therefore, pension funds generally prefer off-market 
to on-market purchases.  
3. Taxation of Corporate Shareholders 
Dividend payments:  
Corporate shareholders are not generally subject to corporation tax on income on a distribution from 
other UK-resident corporations.46 Rather, these dividends form franked (i.e. taxed) investment income 
(FII). Accordingly, the after-tax value of a dividend of £5 to a corporate shareholder is equal to £5. A 
corporation itself, however, has to pay ACT on the dividends and can – in case it receives dividends from 
                                               
43This may be different if the market maker does not act as an intermediary principal. 
44 See http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ctmanual/CTM20510.htm. 
45 While shareholders should generally have preferred dividends over share repurchases, Rau and Vermaelen 
(2002) argue that off-market repurchases may have been appealing to pension funds for two reasons: First, by 
not selling in the open market, pension funds could realize a tax credit, and second, they could buy shares in the 
open market and tender them to the company, thereby realizing arbitrage profits. While the Inland Revenue has 
introduced anti-avoidance rules to prevent this type of arbitrage, Rau and Vermaelen (2002) doubt that these 
rules were effective. 
46 Income and Corporation Taxes Act (ICTA), 1988, s. 208. 
a strategic investment in another firm - deduct the to these dividends attached tax credit from its own 
obligation to pay ACT. 
Off-market repurchases:  
In general terms, section 208 ICTA states that the distributions of UK resident companies are not 
chargeable to corporation tax. More precisely, while according to section 209(2)(b) ICTA the purchase of 
own shares qualifies as a distribution to the extent that the amount paid out by the corporation exceeds the 
repayment of capital in respect of the shares considered, section 209(6) clarifies that this is not the case 
for transfers of assets between UK resident companies that are not under common control. Hence, prior to 
1989, the Inland Revenue held the view that ‘...the distribution element was not to be included in the 
consideration for the disposal of the shares for the purposes of the charge to corporation tax on chargeable 
gains’ for corporate investors, which receive a distribution by means of a share repurchase from a UK 
resident corporation (Birla, 2003: 1). Therefore, the distribution (or capital gain) would not be liable to 
corporation tax, and would constitute franked investment income.47 With the publication of a new 
Statement of Practice in April 1989 applicable to share buy-backs, it was decided that the whole consider-
ation received (including the distribution element) was to be taken into account for the calculation of 
corporation tax on chargeable gains.48 Despite the oppositional decision of the High Court that overturned 
the Revenue Practice, the Court of Appeal later affirmed the views of the Inland Revenue (Birla, 2004). In 
short, according to the Statement of Practice 4/89, the distribution element of share repurchases gives rise 
to chargeable gains and is thus subject to capital gains tax at the Corporation Tax rate, despite a distribu-
tion by a UK company being exempted from corporation tax on income by virtue of section 208 ICTA 
1988 (later replaced by section 1285(1) CTA 2009). Chargeable gains are treated as additional profits for 
the accounting period in question with the amount to be included being the total amount of chargeable 
gains less allowable losses (subject to certain conditions) without the consideration of an annual exempt 
amount.49
The Finance Act 2009 has introduced a new corporation tax regime for distributions paid to a UK 
company on or after 1 July 2009 and section 1285 CTA 2009 has been repealed, i.e. UK sourced distribu-
tions are not longer exempted from Corporation Tax on income. However, as by the new rule, distribu-
tions of a capital nature are not covered, the new corporation tax rules do not apply to the distribution 
element of a share buyback. Recently, the government stated that the coverage would be extended to 
include capital.50 In short, this means that all UK source distributions including capital would be liable to 
income corporation tax unless expressly stated otherwise, i.e. the distribution element would be franked 
investment income. 
On-market repurchases:  
The situation is similar to the one detailed above for individuals. Again, general conclusions are not 
possible, as the attractiveness of the buyback program depends on the shareholder’s capital gain tax 
liability. If the company repurchases 5/P shares at the market price P, and the corporate shareholder 
purchased the shares at an average price B, the total taxes (in £) owed after the repurchase are equal to [5 
(P - B) / P] t.  
                                               
47 After-tax income distributed from one UK-resident company to another. 
48 See Statement of Practice, 4/89. Note: Special rules apply for investment trusts and authorized unit trusts that 
are not considered here. See also Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992, s. 1(2). 
49 Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992, s. 8. 
50 Practical Law Company, Practice note: ‘Share buybacks: tax.’ 
3.1 From 1993: Corporation Tax: 33%
Off-market repurchases:  
In our example, the 5 shares were bought back at a purchase price of £1 per share, while the original 
subscription price was 20p per share and the total acquisition cost of shares were £2.5 (5  50p). Accord-
ingly, the distribution element is £4 (5 (£1 - £0.2), and the capital element is £1.  
A company engaging in a share repurchase has to pay ACT on this distribution element and can then 
transfer the associated tax credit to the corporate shareholder, which is, however, negligible.51 In our 
example, the corporation has to pay 22.5% on the gross distribution element of £4, i.e. 9/31  £4 = £1.16 
(which is equal to 22.5% of the gross figure: £4 + £1.16). Where a company received a ‘dividend’ from 
another UK company, the ACT payment was reduced accordingly: ACT paid = ACT fraction  (divi-
dends paid - dividends received).52  
Concerning the corporate shareholder, the Special Commissioners held that the distribution is to be 
included as consideration for the disposal of the share. The disposal gives rise to chargeable gains, which 
are subject to the corporation tax rate (Statement of Practice (SP) 4/89). According to SP 4/89, the 
corporation tax can be calculated as the buyback purchase price less the acquisition cost of shares. Hence, 
at the main corporation tax rate of 33%, the company has to pay corporation tax on chargeable gains of: 
(£5 - £2.5) 0.33 = £0.825.53 Therefore, the after-tax value of an off-market share repurchase to a corpo-
rate shareholder was equal to: £5 - £0.825 = £4.18.
3.2 From 1994-1996: Corporation Tax: 33% 
Off-market repurchases:  
Similar to the calculation detailed above, the distribution element is £4 and the capital element is £1. 
Consequently, the corporation has to pay 20% of ACT on the gross capital gain of £4, i.e. 20/80  £4 = 
£1 (equal to 20% on the gross amount £5 (£4 + £1). Where a company received a ‘dividend’ itself, the 
ACT payment was reduced accordingly: ACT paid = ACT fraction  (dividends paid - dividends re-
ceived). At the applicable main corporation tax rate of 33%, the company has to pay corporation tax on 
chargeable gains of: (£5 - £2.5) 0.33 = £0.825.54
Therefore, the after-tax value of an off-market share repurchase to a corporate shareholder was equal to: £5 
- £0.825= £4.18. 
3.3 From 1996: Corporation Tax: 33%  
Off-market repurchases:  
Again, as detailed in the calculation above, the distribution element is £4 and the capital element is 
£1.The corporation has to pay 20% of ACT on the gross capital gain, i.e. 1/4  £4 = £1, which is equal to 
20% of the gross amount of £5(£4 + £1). At a current main corporation tax rate of 33%, the company has 
to pay corporation tax on chargeable gains of: (£5 - £2.5) 0.33 = £0.825 Pointon and Spratley (1988: 186)
Therefore, the after-tax value of an off-market share repurchase to a corporate shareholder was equal to: £5 
- £0.825 = £4.18. 
                                               
51 The benefit being only of time value, as it solely affected the time pattern of the ACT set off (Devereux et al. 
2004, Pointon, 7 May 2010). 
52 Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, s. 241. 
53 Pointon and Spratley (1988), p. 186. 
54 Pointon and Spratley (1988), p. 186. 
3.4 From 1997: Corporation Tax: 31% 
Off-market repurchases:  
The situation is largely similar to the one presented above, i.e. the distribution element is £4 and the 
capital element is £1.The corporation has to pay 20% of ACT on the gross capital gain, i.e. 1/4  £4 = £1. 
However, at a current main corporation tax rate of 31%, the company has to pay corporation tax on 
chargeable gains of: (£5 - £2.5) 0.31 = £0.775. Therefore, the after-tax value of an off-market share 
repurchase to a corporate shareholder was equal to: £5 - £0.775 = 4.22£. 
3.5 From 1999: Corporation Tax: 30% 
Off-market repurchases:  
The situation is similar to the one presented above. However, at a current main corporation tax rate of 
30%, the company has to pay corporation tax on chargeable gains of: (£5 - £2.5) 0.30 = £0.75. Therefore, 
the after-tax value of an off-market share repurchase to a corporate shareholder was equal to: £5 - £0.75 = 
4.25£. 
3.6 From 2002: Corporation Tax: 30%  
Off-market repurchases:  
Again, the situation is similar to the one presented above. However, at a current main corporation tax 
rate of 30%, the company has to pay corporation tax on chargeable gains of: (£5 - £2.5) 0.30 = £0.75. 
Therefore, the after-tax value of an off-market share repurchase to a corporate shareholder was equal to: 
£5 - £0.75 = £4.25. However, the introduction of the substantial shareholding exemption in 2002 should 
have contributed positively towards this after-tax value, as it permits UK companies to dispose of ‘sub-
stantial shareholdings’ free of Corporation Tax or CGT. This regime was very important to trading 
groups, as it provided an exemption on disposal of subsidiaries in trading groups. It was also important 
for the UK as a jurisdiction for holding companies. Without this exemption, taxable gains on participa-
tions would be taxable, which would obviously not work for holding companies.55
                                               
55 Interview with Barbara Delputte (Tax Lawyer at Travers Smith, London). 
